2.4 Lockdowns in late 2021

Ngā rāhui i te mutunga o te tau 2021

2.4.1 Introduction | Kupu whakataki

In this chapter we consider the key decisions made in 2021 regarding the imposition and maintenance of lockdowns.⁶⁸⁶ We have interpreted 'lockdowns' to mean the periods of time during which all or parts of New Zealand were subject to Alert Level 3 or 4 restrictions under the Alert Level Framework. This framework applied until 2 December 2021, when the country moved into the COVID-19 Protection Framework. We consider all Alert Level 3 and 4 decisions in 2021 to be lockdown decisions for the purposes of this Inquiry. Since it led to the end of the Auckland lockdown, we also consider decisions about transition to the COVID-19 Protection Framework to be lockdown decisions.

We have particularly focused on the national lockdown in August 2021, decisions to keep Auckland in lockdown until 2 December 2021, shorter additional lockdowns in parts of Northland and the Waikato, and the introduction of the COVID-19 Protection Framework from 2 December 2021. We assess how far decision-makers considered potentially negative social and economic impacts and struck a reasonable balance with public health goals. We also assess the advice that decision-makers received on relevant international experience of exiting lockdowns.

The Government introduced the Alert Level System in 2020, which falls outside the period we are reviewing. New Zealand first used a national lockdown from 25 March 2020, with strict limits on who could leave home, go to work, and travel locally. New Zealand moved to Alert Level 3 on 27 April 2020, and the national lockdown ended on 14 May 2020. Auckland subsequently spent another two and a half weeks in Alert Level 3 in August 2020.

Alert Level 4 restrictions applied to all but those engaging in 'essential services', while ensuring access to the necessities of life and maintaining public health and safety.⁶⁸⁷ Under Alert Level 3, businesses not accessed by the public could operate if they met 'specific, strict requirements for physical distancing, contact tracing, and contactless delivery. Businesses accessed by the public (retail, hospitality) could open, but only for online or phone purchases, and contactless delivery or collection.⁶⁸⁸ Alert Levels 1 and 2 provided for limits on events, meetings and activities that were less restrictive than lockdowns.

Lockdowns, and their impacts, were considered in detail by Phase One of the Inquiry. In relation to the Alert Level System, and lockdowns generally, Phase One's findings included that:

• while Alert Level 4 lockdowns in New Zealand were more stringent than in other countries, New Zealand spent comparatively little time in lockdown during 2020 and the first half of 2021⁶⁸⁹
• during this period, '[l]ockdowns – in combination with tight border restrictions – proved to be an effective tool for achieving and maintaining Aotearoa New Zealand's elimination strategy⁶⁹⁰
• New Zealand would have been less reliant on lockdown restrictions if there had been greater prior investment in core public health tools, capacity and capability⁶⁹¹
• deciding when to start and end lockdowns is challenging and requires difficult trade-offs in the face of uncertainty.⁶⁹²

Decisions to impose, maintain and lift lockdown restrictions had a significant impact on large numbers of people, and had significant cost implications at a national and regional level. In 2021, Alert Level 3 lockdowns took place in Auckland from 14 February to 17 February and from 28 February to 7 March. However, given the short duration of those lockdowns and the emphasis in our Terms of Reference, we do not discuss them here. They do, however, form relevant context to Auckland's position before the lockdown that began there in August 2021.

2.4.2 Lockdown experiences: what participants and submitters told us

Ngā wheako rāhui: ngā 
kōrero a ngā kaiuru me ngā kaituku whakaaro

 
Phase One extensively described how lockdowns impacted the lives of New Zealanders.⁶⁹³ We do not repeat this but briefly set out here a selection of what submitters and participants in Phase Two engagements told us of their experiences of lockdowns.

We received many submissions on the impacts of lockdowns and learned more about them from sectoral and regional engagements during Phase Two. There was both support for lockdowns and opposition.

Evidence has shown the lockdowns saved lives. If we had had a similar mortality rate
as the United States of America, 20,000 New Zealanders would have died. I know they
were hard for many people, but ultimately, they saved the lives of our citizens, and I am
incredibly grateful to our Government for initiating lockdowns. I would want them used again in future pandemics.
25–34-year-old Pākehā female, Northland⁶⁹⁴

I was disappointed about being put in "house arrest" even though l had committed no crime, nor any criminal conviction by a magistrate. I will NOT obey this house arrest order next time.
65–74-year-old male, Canterbury⁶⁹⁵

Many people described negative effects of lockdowns, including isolation, stress, mental health challenges, and the inability to see loved ones.

I think the effects on the mental health of some of our whānau is still being felt today and will be for many years to come when they think back to those anniversaries of when their loved ones [passed] and how they weren’t able to have a a proper tangihanga and it's going to be felt for many years to come.
Representative, Ngā Maia Trust⁶⁹⁶

The societal impact of Auckland being locked down for so long was immense. The stress and hardship it caused were immeasurable.
45–54-year-old Pākehā female, Auckland⁶⁹⁷

Others reported educational disruption with lasting effects.

It was really obvious in our five-year-olds when they started school that we were dealing with a totally different cohort. When they came to school, they weren’t ready in terms of their communication with others. They were extremely anxious about the space they were in and they were not ready to learn.
Representative, teachers’ and principals’ associations forum⁶⁹⁸

Owners of small businesses also faced hardship from lockdowns.

There was a lot of remortgaging and talking with IRD and banks ... it wasn't unusual to hear of members renting out their own houses and going and sleeping on family's couches just to be able to pay the staff and the bills.
Representative, Hospitality New Zealand⁶⁹⁹

2.4.3 The evolving pandemic: the lockdown decisions in context

Te whanaketanga o te mate urutā: ngā whakatau rāhui ā horopaki

 
From 17 August 2021, Cabinet made a series of decisions that first placed all New Zealand in an Alert Level 4 lockdown, and subsequently continued lockdowns in specific regions (especially Auckland) at Alert Level 4 and Alert Level 3. The decision to move to the COVID-19 Protection Framework on 2 December 2021 ended the Alert Level 3 lockdown in Auckland on that date. Appendix 2 sets out a chronology for these decisions, by regions affected (specifically Auckland, Northland and the Waikato).

The Government put lockdown restrictions in place through Orders made under the COVID-19 Public Health Response Act. As discussed in section 2.4.5, the Act provided for the Minister for COVID-19 Response to make Orders putting alert level restrictions in place. In practice, for most of the lockdown Orders, Cabinet was the primary decision-maker while the Minister exercised his statutory powers to implement those decisions.

In May 2020, Cabinet adopted eight (later nine) factors to consider when making decisions about alert level restrictions.⁷⁰⁰ Broadly, these covered the transmission of the virus; health sector capability and capacity; the effects of measures on the economy, society and at-risk populations; public attitudes towards the measures; and the operability of the measures. In October 2021, Cabinet added vaccination rates as another factor.⁷⁰¹

 

2.4.3.1 The context for lockdown decisions changed significantly between August and December 2021  

I rerekē te horopaki mō ngā whakatau rāhui i waenga i Akuhata me Tīhema 2021 

 
As a result of the Government's elimination strategy early in the pandemic, by August 2021, New Zealand had, in contrast to the rest of the world, spent most of the previous 15 months in relative freedom (other than at the border). The Delta variant of COVID-19, which began circulating in New Zealand in August 2021, was more transmissible than earlier variants, giving greater urgency to imposing a national lockdown. By then, more than 80 percent of the total population was still unvaccinated.⁷⁰²

At first, the Government continued to make decisions in pursuit of its previously successful elimination strategy. But by December 2021 the Government had moved to the COVID-19 Protection Framework, which gave effect to a 'minimisation and protection' strategy, and discontinued the use of lockdowns. The change in strategy over a period of 15 weeks reflected the realisation that the virus would not be eliminated, social licence for restrictions was waning, and the economic and social costs of restrictions were accumulating. At the same time the vaccination rate was steadily increasing.

2.4.3.2 Over time it became apparent that the Auckland outbreak would not be eliminated  

I te haere o te wā ka kitea kāore te urutā o Tāmaki Makaurau e whakakorengia atu

 
Over the first month from 17 August, case numbers grew nationally to almost 1,000 in total, most in Auckland. However, the lockdown restrictions were having an effect and advice to Cabinet indicated that the outbreak was contained and was projected to be eliminated.⁷⁰³

From the middle of September 2021, Cabinet initiated work on a new framework, with the intention it would apply once vaccination rates were sufficiently high (see section 2.4.4.3). The Cabinet paper recorded that 'Our central scenario is that we eliminate this current outbreak in Auckland and then move to the new framework once vaccinations are sufficiently high. But officials are also working on a transition scenario where the current outbreak is not eliminated, and we instead gradually move into the new framework while vaccination rates continue to build.⁷⁰⁴

Early in October, Cabinet accepted that it did not expect case numbers in Auckland to return to zero in the near term, and that transition to the new COVID-19 Protection Framework would occur while community transmission continued.⁷⁰⁵

Elimination of the Delta variant by way of lockdown restrictions proved to be extremely challenging because:

• Delta's higher transmissibility and shorter incubation period meant that contact tracing needed to move much more quickly than had been necessary previously
• Delta was circulating in communities such as people in emergency housing and gang networks, some of whom had low trust in authorities and were less willing to comply with contact-tracing and isolation requirements. This made it more challenging to restrict the spread of the virus
• social licence and willingness to comply with restrictions diminished as time went on. Cabinet papers refer to prohibited social gatherings being a primary source of infections
• case numbers, which had slowed in early September, started to increase as the virus began to circulate in communities facing complex or transient living arrangements.
   

Social licence and willingness to comply with restrictions diminished as time went on.

 
2.4.3.3 Increasing vaccination rates made it possible to move to a minimisation and protection strategy

Nā te piki haere o ngā werohanga i taea ai te neke ki tētahi rautaki whakaiti me te whakamaru

 
By 1 October 2021, 1.9 million people (about 37 percent of the total population) were vaccinated.⁷⁰⁶ By 27 October 2021, approximately 78 percent of the eligible population in Auckland was vaccinated.⁷⁰⁷ By 1 November, the total number of cases in Auckland since 17 August, had grown to more than 3,000 with about another 150 in the rest of the country.⁷⁰⁸

By mid-November 2021 total cases in Auckland since 17 August had reached almost 5,000, and the seven-day rolling average for New Zealand was 166 cases per day.⁷⁰⁹ Modelling provided to Cabinet showed transmission rates were expected to decrease over time, but actual case numbers were following a pessimistic trajectory.⁷¹⁰ However, by the end of the month case numbers were consistent with an optimistic trajectory, and modelling suggested the growth in case numbers would slow. Ninety percent of the eligible population was fully vaccinated in the Auckland District Health Board area by 19 November, with Waitematā and Counties Manukau District Health Boards at 87 percent and 84 percent respectively, though rates for Māori and Pacific people were substantially lower.⁷¹¹

Reports of international experience with increasing vaccination rates and reducing restrictions on activity were mixed (see section 2.4.6.4). In October 2021, officials provided cautionary comparisons with the trajectory of the outbreak in Victoria, Australia, but also reported the intention of New South Wales to ease restrictions when vaccination rates of the eligible population had reached 70 percent. Officials also advised that health sector capacity in New Zealand was lower than in Australia and other countries that were then reducing restrictions.⁷¹³

Forecasts provided to Cabinet on 22 November indicated that by the week of 29 November 2021, about 86 percent of the eligible population would be fully vaccinated, with Auckland District Health Boards expected to have vaccination rates above that.⁷¹⁴ Most Boards were projected to be above 90 percent by the end of 2021. However, equivalent rates for Māori were much lower than whole-population averages in the same areas.

 

2.4.3.4 Lockdowns had effects on economic activity

I whai pānga ngā rāhui ki ngā mahi ōhanga

 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a measure of economic activity in a country or region. Changes in GDP reflect changes in production, employment, incomes, expenditure and consumption. Lockdowns had dramatic impacts on economic activity in areas under restriction and throughout the rest of the country. Officials provided regular estimates of actual and expected reductions in national GDP.

At the beginning of the national lockdown in August 2021, and based on the experience of the 2020 lockdowns, officials advised ministers they expected impacts on GDP to be temporary and short-term (see section 2.4.6.2). Unemployment was about 4 percent, close to the 4.1 percent unemployment rate in December 2019, and much reduced from a peak of 5.2 percent in September 2020.⁷¹⁵ Officials expected economic activity to rebound once lockdowns were lifted.

However, in mid-November 2021 the Treasury advised the Minister of Finance that the cumulative effect of lockdowns from 17 August to 5 November was a drop of 5.6 percent in expected national GDP over the period in Auckland, and 4.2 percent for the rest of New Zealand – a very substantial impact.⁷¹⁶

 

2.4.3.5 Officials reported on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal supports and the social impacts of lockdowns  

I tuku kōrero ngā āpiha mō ngā pānga ōhanga whānui o ngā tautoko tahua me ngā pānga pāpori o ngā rāhui

 
At the beginning of the national lockdown in August 2021, officials advised Cabinet that as net Crown debt was at 31 percent of GDP, the Government had the option to continue the Wage Subsidy Scheme and other economic supports for people affected by lockdowns (see section 2.4.6.2). However, the Treasury continued to highlight uncertainties about the macroeconomic situation throughout the lockdown from August to December 2021, and the risk of fiscal supports 'compounding [emerging] inflationary pressures'. The Treasury and the Ministry of Social Development advised decisionmakers that, on balance, it was appropriate to 'stay the course'.⁷¹⁷

Cabinet papers for alert level decisions included regular high-level reports of adverse social impacts of lockdown measures and, in November 2021, a high-level descriptive account of their cumulative impact over time. Cabinet papers also reported on changes in public attitudes to and compliance with the measures. This informed Cabinet's decisions over this period to reduce and ultimately end the lockdown restrictions, as other conditions (noted above) permitted.

2.4.4 National and regional lockdown decisions, 17 August to 29 November 2021

Ngā whakatau rāhui ā-motu, ā-rohe hoki, 17 Akuhata ki te 29 Noema 2021

 
Cabinet made frequent decisions on lockdown measures nationally, and in specific regions, over the period 17 August 2021 to 2 December 2021. In section 2.4.6 below, we set out the advice given to Cabinet on the economic and social impacts of lockdowns and on international experience in easing lockdown restrictions.

Over this period Auckland spent 107 days continuously in lockdown. Parts of the Waikato spent 57 days in lockdown, with some gaps. Northland spent 30 days in lockdown (and upper Northland another 6 days). The rest of New Zealand spent about three weeks in lockdown. Even when not in lockdown, Northland experienced significant restrictions because its only land border was with Auckland.

2.4.4.1 The Government placed New Zealand in an Alert Level 4 lockdown on 17 August 2021

I whakatauria e te Kāwanatanga kia uru a Aotearoa ki te Rāhui Taumata 4 i te 17 o Akuhata 2021 

 
On 17 August 2021, a community case was identified in Auckland. It was the Delta variant of COVID-19. Internationally, Delta was proving more harmful and more contagious than earlier variants, and the source of the new case was not clear, suggesting there could be undetected community transmission. Cabinet agreed in principle to shift New Zealand to Alert Level 4⁷¹⁸ and the decision was given effect on the same day, by Order of the Minister for COVID-19 Response.⁷¹⁹

Cabinet then made decisions about alert levels every three to four days for the remainder of August.⁷²⁰ As it became clearer that almost all cases were in Auckland, the Government moved the rest of New Zealand (except Northland) to Alert Level 3 from 31 August 2021, then to Alert Level 2 from 7 September 2021. Northland moved to Alert Level 2 with the rest of the country on 7 September 2021.

2.4.4.2 Auckland moved to Alert Level 3 on 21 September 2021 after five weeks at Alert Level 4

I neke a Tāmaki Makaurau ki te Taumata 3 i te 21 o Hepetema 2021, whai muri i te rima wiki i te Taumata 4

 
The Ministry of Health's Public Health Risk Assessments on 12 and 19 September 2021 indicated that cases were trending downwards in Auckland. The 12 September assessment recommended that Auckland move to Alert Level 3 on 16 September. The Director-General of Health agreed, 'dependent on nothing unexpected arising from testing on case investigations in the interim'.⁷²¹

The COVID-19 Response Minister noted the Director-General's recommendation in a paper to Cabinet on 13 September 2021. He also raised an option to hold Auckland at Alert Level 4 until 21 September to be more confident that there was no undetected community transmission, and recommended doing so.⁷²² The Minister noted a risk that easing restrictions and then tightening them again could be more detrimental in terms of social licence, mental health, pressures on at-risk communities and economic costs than delaying a move to Alert Level 3. Cabinet agreed with the Minister's recommendation to keep Auckland at Alert Level 4 for a further week.

The Public Health Risk Assessment of 19 September 2021⁷²³ further noted the outbreak was confined to identified communities and there was medium risk of community transmission. It recommended moving to Alert Level 3.

Cabinet agreed on 20 September 2021, on the advice of the Minister for COVID-19 Response and the Director-General, to move Auckland to Alert Level 3 on 21 September, with a review on 4 October.⁷²⁴ By then, Auckland had spent five weeks at Alert Level 4.

2.4.4.3 Cabinet initiated work on a new Alert Level Framework and vaccination target in September 2021  

I tīmata Te Rūnanga Minita i te waihanga o tētahi anga Taumata Whakatūpato hou me tētahi whāinga werohanga i Hepetema 2021

 
On 15 September 2021, the Cabinet Business Committee directed work to begin on 'a new Alert Level framework that could be applied once the vaccination rollout is complete'.⁷²⁵ The next day, in the daily press conference, the Director-General of Health spoke of the need for 'a very high vaccination level ...at or above 90 percent' and the Prime Minister added that such a level of vaccination would reduce the need for 'overly restrictive rules around us'.⁷²⁶

A few days later, Te Pūnaha Matatini⁷²⁷ released modelling based on the assumption New Zealand could achieve vaccine coverage across the total population of more than 90 percent.⁷²⁸ Modelling showed the impact of different vaccination rates on reproduction numbers, infections, hospitalisations and deaths. The report concluded that those impacts would be least significant with more than 90 percent vaccination coverage of the eligible population. However, even at that level of coverage,

there could still be high levels of population morbidity and mortality under conditions of low or waning vaccine effectiveness. These sorts of outcomes would generally be outside the capacity of the health system to cope, so they would likely require the imposition of more stringent measures ...

On 23 September 2021, the COVID-19 Independent Continuous Review, Improvement and Advice Group chaired by Sir Brian Roche wrote to the Minister for COVID-19 Response.⁷²⁹ Headed 'Observations from the Recent Delta Outbreak and their Impact on Reconnecting New Zealanders', the letter identified preconditions to reopening, including vaccination coverage of 'well over 90 percent'. The Group also advised that the vaccination programme was clearly 'failing certain populations, most notably Māori, who are at higher risk of serious disease and death than non-Māori. Addressing such disparities is an urgent priority'.⁷³⁰

On 27 September 2021, Cabinet considered the new COVID-19 Protection Framework in detail for the first time and agreed on its goals.⁷³¹ The Cabinet paper emphasised the importance of high vaccination rates, noting that 'the risk of transmission will be meaningfully reduced at 80 percent coverage for the eligible population, and will be further reduced if we can achieve coverage as high as 90 percent'. The Cabinet Minute noted the priority of 'achieving and maintaining the highest possible level of vaccination'.

2.4.4.4 To ease the burden of restrictions, Cabinet agreed to define new stages for Alert Level 3 lockdowns in early October 2021

Hei whakangāwari i te taumahatanga o ngā here, i whakaae Te Rūnanga Minita ki te tautuhi i ngā kaupae hou mō te Rāhui Taumata 3 i te tīmatanga o Oketopa 2021

 
Shortly after Auckland had moved to Alert Level 3 on 21 September 2021, the Government decided to break Alert Level 3 into three 'stages'. Ministers told us that this was to try to ease the burden of lockdown restrictions on Aucklanders in light of the fact that the virus was not being eliminated.⁷³²

A briefing by the Director-General to the Minister on 30 September 2021 considered 'whether Auckland can take the first of three step-down stages within the Alert Level 3 settings discussed by COVID-19 Response Ministers on 29 September 2021.'⁷³³ It concluded, '[a] Public Health Risk Assessment has found that the careful design of the "stage 1 step down" of Alert Level 3 already discussed by Ministers is appropriate at this time ... because the new freedoms are not particularly high risk'.⁷³⁴

On 4 October 2021, Cabinet agreed to adopt the staged approach to Alert Level 3 and decided that Auckland would move to stage 1 the following day.⁷³⁵ The Cabinet paper highlighted the need to balance two factors: the public health risk presented by the virus, and 'the evidence of eroding social license for heightened restrictions amongst compliant parts of the Auckland population who have endured a significant time at heightened Alert Levels'.⁷³⁶

At a high level, the three stages allowed for the following:

• Stage 1: Outdoor gatherings for up to 10 people and outdoor recreation permitted, and some controlled gatherings (weddings, funerals/tangihanga) with a maximum of 10 people. ECE to open under certain conditions
• Stage 2: Retail could operate, with 2metre distancing and face masks. Public facilities could open and outdoor gatherings could be for up to 25 people
• Stage 3: Hospitality could reopen, with seating requirements and a cap of 50 people. Event facilities could reopen for up to 50 people. Close contact businesses, such as hairdressers, could reopen. Outdoor gatherings could take place with up to 50 people.

Unlike the alert levels, the stringency of the stages decreased as the numbers (stage 1, 2 or 3) increased. The three stages were confusing to some people, and feedback to ministers recorded this.⁷³⁷

2.4.4.5 Officials and Ministers worked on the design of a new framework and vaccination targets in the two weeks up to 18 October 2021

I ngā wiki e rua i mua atu i te 18 o Oketopa 2021, i mahi ngātahi ngā āpiha me ngā Minita ki te hoahoa i tētahi anga hou me ngā whāinga werohanga

 
An internal Ministry of Health briefing to the Director-General on 1 October 2021 signalled a preference for 80 percent of the population to be vaccinated before transition to a new framework.⁷³⁸ It is not clear whether this referred to the total or eligible population. An email to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet on the same day stated that the Chief Science Advisor at the Ministry of Health did not expect effective reduction of COVID-19 transmission 'under this kind of framework' without at least 85 percent of over 12-year-olds being fully vaccinated. Effectiveness would improve with vaccination above 90 percent 'as long as there are no vulnerable pockets, eg Māori youth'.⁷³⁹

On 4 October 2021, Cabinet agreed to a draft new framework that officials had prepared for the purposes of further work and consultation.⁷⁴⁰ It expected that the transition to the new framework would be completed in November. The Cabinet paper noted the benefits of 90 percent vaccination as opposed to 70 percent but set no target. Modelling would be undertaken to 'explore', as a high priority, the precise nature of restrictions that would be necessary to result in an effective reproduction number close to, or below, 1 in different vaccination scenarios.

A few days later, on 8 October, the Strategic COVID-19 Public Health Advisory Group advised the Associate Minister of Health on the proposed framework. It emphasised the importance of a high vaccination rate but advised that vaccination alone was not enough. Even with 85 percent of the eligible population vaccinated, the estimated effective reproduction number would be 1.16.⁷⁴¹

On 10 October 2021, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet briefed the Prime Minister on development of the framework.⁷⁴² It advised that further work was required to 'agree and articulate the strategy for using the different levels of restrictions ...'⁷⁴³ It also advised on the 'right time' to transition to the framework, noting that transition was inseparable from management of the current outbreak.

The same briefing to the Prime Minister noted that the goal remained elimination outside Auckland and minimisation within it. At the inception of framework planning, lower case numbers had been expected in Auckland, providing the necessary 'stable domestic platform on which to pivot to a new framework'.⁷⁴⁴ Lower numbers had not eventuated and instead Auckland was now 'at a critical juncture' – how transmission evolved over the next few weeks would have a 'significant bearing on the "starting point" for the future strategy'.⁷⁴⁵

The briefing added that the strategy of minimisation and protection would be undermined by high rates of infection, in circumstances where 'the health system, including primary care and community services as well as hospitals and ICUs, is not yet ready to handle more cases or more hospitalisations on a sustainable basis.' The briefing recorded that the Ministry of Health was advocating for transition to the new framework to be conditional on health system readiness. Furthermore, 'Transitioning to a new framework in advance of achieving very high rates of vaccination creates significant risks to the integrity of the current response, as confusion or misunderstanding around the rules will reduce compliance.'⁷⁴⁶

Ministry of Health officials briefed the Director-General on 15 October on 'health-based pre-conditions for moving to traffic lights'. They did not advise moving to the new framework until the rate of transmission in Auckland was 'no longer rising' and 'a significant enough proportion of the New Zealand population' (90 percent) was fully vaccinated.⁷⁴⁷ They further advised:

In order to mitigate the impact on Māori and other vulnerable population groups, we ideally would want to achieve a 90% vaccination rate amongst these groups before we move to the new system, while ensuring that the health system is ready to support people who experience serious illness, vaccinated or otherwise.⁷⁴⁸

On 18 October 2021, Cabinet formally adopted a target of 90 percent vaccination of eligible populations for transition to the new framework. We have reviewed drafts of the 18 October Cabinet paper circulated to agencies in the previous week.⁷⁴⁹ These drafts set out various options for vaccination targets, including with a focus on vaccination rates for people over the age of 40 or 50 (recognising their increased susceptibility to adverse outcomes from COVID-19) and for certain ethnic groups. An early draft recognised the 'trade-offs' involved in balancing vaccination targets and the endurance of the Auckland lockdown.⁷⁵⁰ A later draft highlighted a concern that 'targets that meant Auckland needed to wait long for other parts of the country or specific ethnic groups to be vaccinated would significantly erode social cohesion'.⁷⁵¹ Ministerial feedback on a draft Cabinet paper had noted Māori concerns about needing 90–95 percent vaccination rates to provide adequate protection from COVID-19.⁷⁵²

On 17 October 2021, the Ministry of Health advised that the target should be 90 percent full vaccination for over-40s in all ethnic groups.⁷⁵³ A comment on the draft Cabinet paper noted that 'The modelling demonstrates the very real risks of allowing R to rise to 1.3 or higher.'⁷⁵⁴

Later that day, the Prime Minister's office sent edits to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.⁷⁵⁵ These edits replaced the age-based vaccination target with a proposal to have two separate targets: 90 percent vaccination of the entire eligible population in (a) Auckland and (b) the rest of the country.

The Prime Minister's proposal was that Auckland and the rest of the country could be treated separately. She also proposed that the South Island might move to the Framework earlier if it reached 90 percent before the rest of the North Island. An email from her office stated 'we will need clear advice about the implications of moving Auckland over to traffic light before the rest of the country. This will need to cover the operational and legal challenges, and way this could be mitigated.'⁷⁵⁶

Former Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern told us that she was conscious of not wanting any portion of the community to be 'blamed' for not meeting a target and said there were concerns regarding ethnically-based targets for this reason.⁷⁵⁷ She was clear that there needed to be funding for, and a focus on, vaccinating those groups, but care needed to be taken around publicly communicated targets. Further, if targets were by age band, then there would still likely be pockets of the community with much lower vaccination rates who would be at higher risk and could contribute to higher transmission – in her view, geographic spread of vaccination was therefore important and the most appropriate means of categorising the target.

The former Prime Minister also explained that the Government was under a lot of pressure to have a target for ending the lockdown: either a vaccination-rate target or a communicated date by which people could choose (or not) to be vaccinated. Ministers preferred not using a date as this option did not account for the time and access to advice that some vaccine-hesitant people needed. It may also have resulted in loosening restrictions with a level of vaccination insufficient to protect immunocompromised people.

2.4.4.6 Cabinet decided on 18 October 2021 to replace the elimination strategy with the COVID-19 Protection Framework and to adopt vaccination targets  

I te 18 o Oketopa 2021, i whakatau Te Rūnanga Minita kia whakakapi i te rautaki whakakore ki te Anga Tiaki KOWHEORI-19, ā, kia whakaae hoki ki ngā whāinga werohanga

 
On 18 October 2021, Cabinet agreed to replace the elimination strategy with the minimisation and protection approach, and to use the COVID-19 Protection Framework for New Zealand's domestic response to the virus 'once New Zealand has reached the agreed conditions for transition'.⁷⁵⁸

Cabinet had previously agreed that the purposes of the new Framework were:

to focus on vaccination, aggressive isolation, and controlling COVID-19, ... to keep sickness and mortality at low levels without returning to Alert Level 3 and 4 lockdowns, and with more stable, less intrusive public health controls, while being able to open more at the border.⁷⁵⁹

The paper noted that the Minister for COVID-19 Response would update Cabinet on 15 November on transition plans, with a second 'full plan in late November or early December.'⁷⁶⁰ This was a later transition than Cabinet had envisaged on 4 October.

In the Cabinet paper, the Prime Minister stated that vaccination and health system readiness were the 'critical enablers of the new approach. ... we need to have confidence that our health system is as ready as it can be in the time available and that vaccination rates are high enough to enable a shift.'⁷⁶¹ As outlined above, the paper proposed separate vaccination targets, and therefore potentially different dates of transition, for Auckland and the rest of the country.

The Prime Minister advised Cabinet that vaccinating 90 percent of the eligible population would equate to roughly 76 percent of the total population, putting New Zealand among developed countries with the highest rates. 'This demonstrates that this is a target that is achievable, but one that will require us to do better than most countries we compare ourselves with.'⁷⁶²

Cabinet agreed in principle to two vaccination targets for transitioning to the new Framework: 90 percent full vaccination of those eligible for (a) each District Health Board in Auckland, and (b) each District Health Board outside Auckland. This decision was subject to considering the operational and legal implications of operating two frameworks simultaneously, and confirmation by COVID-19 Response Ministers with Power to Act.⁷⁶³

On 19 October 2021, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet briefed the Prime Minister on whether one or some regions could be in the COVID-19 Protection Framework with others still in the Alert Level System.⁷⁶⁴ It outlined practical difficulties with such an approach. It was for noting only and sought no decision.

About 20 October 2021, Ministers with Power to Act confirmed the 90 percent vaccination targets. On 20 October 2021 a briefing from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to those Ministers proposed that the targets be reviewed by Cabinet on Monday 29 November 'at the same time as officials expect to report on readiness for implementation of the new framework in Auckland'.⁷⁶⁵ The Ministers agreed. The targets remained in place and vaccine results were tracked against them over the next month.

The timing for transition also depended on the development of a legal framework for COVID vaccination certificates and additional work was needed on vaccine requirements for workers in high-risk settings. The Minister for COVID-19 Response was to report back to Cabinet on 26 October with details of the regime and necessary legislative change.⁷⁶⁶

On 22 October 2021, the Prime Minister announced that:

A target of 90 percent fully vaccinated across each DHB region has been set as the milestone to trigger moving the country into the new system. This target ensures good regional spread across the country and will also help address equity issues within each region. Modelling shows having 90 percent of eligible people fully vaccinated provides a high level of coverage, keeping most New Zealanders safe and helping slow and control outbreaks, assisting public health authorities to do their job.⁷⁶⁷

 
2.4.4.7 Cabinet changed the geographic scope and stringency of lockdowns in October and November 2021  

I whakarerekē Te Rūnanga Minita i te whānuitanga ā-rohe me te kaha o ngā rāhui i Oketopa me Noema 2021

 
As the Government designed and moved towards implementing the new COVID-19 Protection Framework, it continued to amend the geographic scope and stringency of lockdowns, including in relation to education, as daily case rates and transmission fluctuated. The Delta outbreak centred on Auckland was the primary focus, though lockdowns also affected Northland and Waikato.

• Cabinet kept Auckland at Alert Level 3.1 through decisions on 11 and 18 October and 1 November 2021. It moved Auckland to Alert Level 3.2 on 9 November, where it remained until 2 December 2021, when New Zealand entered the new COVID-19 Protection Framework.
• As a result of the travel movements of an Auckland case, Northland moved to Alert Level 3 (up from Alert Level 2) on 8 October and stayed there until 19 October. Upper Northland moved briefly to Alert Level 3 from 2 November to 8 November 2021, as a result of a two cases identified in Kaitaia.
• Parts of Waikato moved to Alert Level 3 on 3 October (as a result of two cases identified in Raglan and Hamilton), to Alert Level 3.1 on 27 October, to Alert Level 3.2 on 2 November, and back to Alert Level 2 on 16 November.

On 11 October 2021, Cabinet agreed with a recommendation from the Minister for COVID-19 Response to hold Auckland at Alert Level 3.1. Cabinet noted the Acting Director-General of Health's interim advice that the growth of cases in Auckland was not exponential.⁷⁶⁸ Public communications had emphasised that public health advice would inform decisions to relax restrictions, and such decisions would be made only when it was safe to do so. The Minister noted that '[d]espite this, there will be a public expectation that there will not be long delays between shifts'. He had asked officials to consider criteria for further relaxing restrictions, noting there were 'differing risk tolerances for case numbers'.⁷⁶⁹

Cabinet next reviewed alert levels on 18 October 2021. Cabinet agreed with the Minister's recommendation to hold Auckland at Alert Level 3.1. The Cabinet paper records that the Director-General of Health advised that there had been a 'significant increase in the number of unlinked cases in Auckland', and undetected community transmission was likely.⁷⁷⁰

The Cabinet paper stated that the Minister was considering how to address increasing case numbers but observed that most new cases resulted from gatherings that were not permitted at current settings so reimposing more strict settings might not have the desired effect. 'This illustrates the challenges we face with declining social licence and compliance amongst sectors of the Auckland community'.⁷⁷¹

The Minister for COVID-19 Response went on to propose that Cabinet 'signal that a shift to stage two is unlikely in the near term, but reassure the public that more detailed information about the stage two settings will be communicated prior to any shift occurring'.

During this time, Cabinet was also considering whether there should be a return to face-to-face learning for all students in Auckland despite this not having previously been permitted under Alert Level 3. Cabinet had decided on 4 October 2021 that Auckland schools would reopen to all students on 18 October 2021, subject to the latest public health advice and appropriate public health controls being in place. On 11 October 2021, it agreed to delay decisions on reopening schools, and to confirm the arrangements and conditions for the reopening of Auckland schools to all year groups, until its meeting on 18 October 2021.

In the 18 October alert level Cabinet paper, the Minister proposed further deferring the reopening of schools to all students, based on public health advice. He urged careful consideration of whether the benefits of allowing secondary students eligible for vaccination to return to school earlier would be outweighed by the risk of increased transmission.⁷⁷² He acknowledged that there were 'difficult trade-offs between improving education outcomes and increasing potential health risks' for learners and their whānau.⁷⁷³

The Minister advised that a decision to maintain distance learning would have a disproportionately negative impact on Māori, Pacific and disabled learners, and learners from disadvantaged backgrounds. It would also be more difficult for those sitting exams.

Cabinet authorised the Prime Minister, education ministers and the Associate Minister of Health to have Power to Act to take decisions on the scope and timing of reopening schools and early learning services in Auckland.⁷⁷⁴ Students in years 11 to 13 returned to face-to-face learning on 26 October 2021.

2.4.4.8 Cabinet took further decisions on alert levels and transitioning to the new Framework as case numbers continued to grow in November 2021

I te pikinga tonutanga o ngā tatauranga take i Noema 2021, i whakatau anō Te Rūnanga Minita mō ngā taumata whakatūpato me te whakawhitinga ki te Anga hou

 
The next review took place two weeks later, on 1 November 2021. Case numbers were still increasing. The Director-General of Health's advice was not to relax restrictions in the Auckland region 'given the available evidence indicates the risk is not decreasing and is most likely slowly increasing, and that the potential impact of returning students is yet to be seen.' The 1 November 2021 Cabinet paper noted 'current thinking' that Year 1-8 students could return to school on 16 or 17 November,⁷⁷⁵ and that this would be put before Cabinet for a decision on 8 November.

The Director-General recommended holding Auckland at Alert Level 3.1 until at least 15 November. The Minister recommended that Cabinet review the situation on 15 November but suggested that Ministers with Power to Act should be authorised to move to stage 2 on 8 November if supported by evidence.

Cabinet departed from the recommendations. While it agreed to keep Auckland at Alert Level 3.1, it agreed in principle that Auckland would move to Level 3.2 on 9 November 2021, subject to a further public health risk assessment and confirmation by Cabinet on 8 November 2021.

Information in a Cabinet paper of 8 November 2021 showed that case numbers were continuing to grow. The Cabinet paper recorded that the Public Health Risk Assessment from Friday 5 November indicated that the Auckland public health service was 'stretched' and 'there is concern about the impact the ongoing rise in case numbers will have on the health system'.⁷⁷⁶

Notwithstanding the case numbers and modelling, the Director-General of Health recommended that Auckland move to Alert Level 3.2, 'for a minimum of two weeks, pending no unexpected developments, and noting the concerns regarding the pressure on and ongoing development of the case management and care in the community programme in Auckland'. His recommendation stated that 'The risk of increasing case numbers is likely to be outweighed by the benefits of easing restrictions in [sic] the wellbeing of people living in the region, particularly as vaccination rates continue to increase.'

The Minister for COVID-19 Response also stated, 'I consider that moving Auckland to Stage Two will increase economic activity and improve the wellbeing of people living in the region, particularly as vaccination rates continue to increase.'

Cabinet agreed to move Auckland to Alert Level 3.2 the following day, 9 November. It further invited the Minister for COVID-19 Response to report back to Cabinet on 15 November 2021 'on the path for moving Auckland to Alert Level 3 stage three'.

The 15 November alert level Cabinet paper noted it was expected that Auckland would transition to the new framework in the week beginning 29 November 2021.⁷⁷⁷ It advised that shifting to stage 3 in Auckland rather than waiting until the transition to the COVID-19 Protective Framework 'may generate net-negative outcomes'.⁷⁷⁸ The original intent had been to move Auckland down all three stages of Alert Level 3 but the Cabinet paper highlighted the 'potential confusion' as '… People and businesses [would] need to get used to a new set of restrictions which could now be in place for little over a week.'⁷⁷⁹ This suggests decision-makers were also influenced by matters falling outside Cabinet's nine adopted factors when making later alert level decisions, which we discuss in more detail in section 2.4.11.2.

Cabinet also decided then to maintain a boundary around Auckland until 16 January 2022. People leaving Auckland after 15 December 2021 would be required to either be vaccinated or have a negative COVID-19 test within 72 hours of exit. This decision went against advice from officials that such requirements were not necessary or practical.⁷⁸⁰

On 22 November 2021, Cabinet was scheduled to review alert level settings in Auckland, but in the event made no formal decision on those settings.⁷⁸¹ Instead, Cabinet rescinded the 90 percent vaccination targets and agreed in principle, subject to review on 29 November, that New Zealand would move to the new framework on 2 December 2021. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet prepared talking points for the Minister for COVID-19 Response which stated that '[t]here is little value in Auckland shifting to Alert Level 3 Step 3 for a very short period, before moving into the Framework'.⁷⁸²

In one of our interviews with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern, she explained that Cabinet had not given up on having more than 90 percent of the population vaccinated, but Ministers were satisfied that that figure was going to be reached by the end of December. She said that this timing influenced their decision because:

• a transition at the end of December would be challenging as there would be issues with having people available to put various aspects of the new framework into operation. A transition early in December could be managed more smoothly, and
• Ministers knew the importance to the public of being able to reunite for Christmas, and wanted to facilitate that.⁷⁸³

On 22 November, Auckland vaccination rates were projected to be between 86 percent and 92 percent of eligible people within the week. On 29 November 2021, Cabinet confirmed its decision to move to the COVID-19 Protection Framework on 2 December 2021, effectively ending lockdowns from that date.⁷⁸⁴ On 30 November, the Minister made an Order under section 11 of COVID-19 Public Health Response Act to achieve the purpose in section 4 of the Act.⁷⁸⁵

2.4.5 Who were the lockdown decision-makers?

Nā wai ngā rāhui i whakatau?

 
In order to assess whether decisions were sufficiently informed as to the matters outlined in our Terms of Reference and reasonably balanced, we first need to identify the decision-makers.

As we have explained, the Minister for COVID-19 Response put in place and adjusted alert levels by orders under the COVID-19 Public Health Response Act 2020. However, in 2021, Cabinet primarily made the alert level decisions and the Minister exercised his statutory powers to give effect to those decisions.

Although Cabinet did not have decision-making powers under the COVID-19 Public Health Response Act 2020, its approach largely reflected the considerations specified in the Act. Cabinet papers put forward by the Minister for the purpose of decisions on alert levels followed a high-level structure that considered each of the eight or nine factors adopted by Cabinet (see Appendix 2). At the conclusion of the public health advice in the Cabinet paper, the Minister would give a recommendation on alert levels that, in most cases, mirrored the recommendation of the Director-General of Health.

After the recommendation section, the Cabinet paper would address the other four factors under the heading 'Assessment of the proposed measures/options against the non-health factors.' Cabinet minutes always recorded that Cabinet had noted the public health advice provided by the Director-General but did not record noting of advice concerning social, economic or other impacts.

Following Cabinet's decisions (or, in a small number of cases, decisions by Ministers with Power to Act), the COVID-19 Public Health Response Act required the Minister to exercise the section 11 power in accordance with section 9 of that Act. As we have explained in Part 1, section 9 required the Minister to consider whether the Order was appropriate to achieve the purpose of the Act, which in turn required him or her to consider proportionality, economic sustainability and, where relevant, economic, social and other factors. This was a critical safeguard in the Act.

Briefings from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet containing draft alert level Orders for the Minister for COVID-19 Response all followed a similar structure. That template did not include any section for consideration of the purpose of the Act. Nor did the Department's briefings alert the Minister to the specific requirement that he consider whether the Order was appropriate to achieve the purpose of Act. During the period under consideration, the Department's alert level order briefings did not contain any advice on or assessment of the appropriateness of alert level orders to achieve the purpose in section 4 of Act.

When the Minister signed alert level orders under the COVID-19 Public Health Response Act, in most cases there had already been detailed consideration by Cabinet which, as stated above, largely reflected the considerations specified in the Act. The Minister was entitled under the Act to have regard to decisions of Cabinet as to appropriate levels of public health measures and was required to consult with ministerial colleagues.

Similarly, decisions about the timing for transition to the COVID-19 Protection Framework were made by Cabinet. The Minister for COVID-19 Response made an Order under the Act to put the Framework in place once those decisions had been made. The briefing from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in relation to that Order did not contain any advice on or assessment of the appropriateness of that Order to achieve the purpose in section 4 of the Act.⁷⁸⁶

The primary assessment of factors other than public health in relation to lockdown key decisions therefore appears to have been that which was undertaken by Cabinet ministers (who we refer to as decision-makers), and this has been the focus of our assessment. We return to this aspect of the decision-making process in Part 3.

2.4.6  What advice and information was provided to support key decisions?

He aha ngā tohutohu me ngā pārongo i tukuna hei tautoko i ngā whakatau matua

 
To assess whether lockdown decisions were sufficiently informed and reasonably balanced, we must also identify the sources and nature of the advice decision-makers received.

2.4.6.1 Decision-makers received information from many different sources

I whiwhi ngā kaiwhakatau i ngā pārongo nō ngā puna maha

Cabinet papers and advice from officials

Cabinet generally made the key decisions about lockdowns, with the Minister for COVID-19 Response giving them effect.⁷⁸⁷ The associated Cabinet papers recorded the key considerations. We have also heard from decision-makers about how they were receiving a broad range of information from many varied sources in addition to those papers.

The COVID-19 Group at the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet had overall responsibility for preparation of Cabinet papers and specifically provided advice on public attitudes and on implementing decisions. The Ministry of Health prepared advice on health and the Treasury on economic impacts. The Ministry of Social Development provided information on the impacts on at-risk populations with input from the National Emergency Management Agency⁷⁸⁸ and social service providers.

The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet has advised that, given the short timeframes applying, there was often limited formal consultation and review processes after compilation of information and advice. We consider that this was a key factor in how the papers were structured and the (at times) repetitive nature of the information they contained. Some of these matters are addressed in more detail in section 2.4.7.

In addition to Cabinet papers, officials were providing frequent and extensive briefings to ministers. Where departments provided advice for their responsible minister, they tailored it to be relevant to that portfolio. This meant different ministers had different information that they brought to the decision-making process.

Groups of department Chief Executives met almost daily during the lockdown period and were able to channel information from business and community groups back to decision-makers. This covered both impacts on industries and ways in which alert level restrictions were causing difficulty or could be improved.

The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet collated information for weekly reports to relevant Ministers. These included its own updates and those from the Ministry for Business, Innovation and Employment, the Ministry of Health, Customs, the Border Executive Board and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. When relevant, they also noted the activity of advisory groups, the Business Leaders Forum,⁷⁸⁹ a Community Panel, and the Government Modelling Group.⁷⁹⁰ Those groups also had their own channels for providing updates and advice.

The ministers most closely involved in the COVID-19 response were meeting or speaking with senior officials from key departments every day to discuss the progress of the outbreak and other related matters. Decision-makers also met or spoke regularly with modelling teams to obtain up-to-date data and forecasts. The Prime Minister was in close contact with her Chief Science Advisor, who in turn was obtaining rapidly updated information from international networks.

The Minister of Finance was meeting with officials from the Treasury many times each week, obtaining advice about the level of economic and fiscal supports in place during the lockdowns. The Treasury also provided written briefings with more extensive economic analysis and advice than included in Cabinet papers. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment provided advice on business matters.

Overall, the meetings, calls and briefings that took place were described to us as 'constant dialogue',⁷⁹¹ and we were told that 'there was a lot of information, but digesting that was a full-time thing. For a number of us, that was every day, all day, every day, and it didn't stop.'⁷⁹² It is clear to us that decision-makers received a very wide range of information with high frequency, and that this information was also informing key lockdown decisions.

Data and modelling advice

Decision-makers were also receiving additional data and modelling outside the Cabinet process.

On health outcomes, modelling showed possible scenarios in terms of case numbers, hospitalisations and deaths. Modellers produced indicators to assess the overall success of a variety of different tools. For example, combining data from daily testing results, sampling, wastewater testing and (later) self-reporting could give a picture of the extent of the outbreak.

Decision-makers also knew about the different approaches being taken in other countries. They told us they received modelling to show how those alternative approaches could play out in New Zealand.⁷⁹³

Government agencies were not alone in providing modelling. Non-governmental science advisors, scientists, epidemiologists and modellers spoke frequently in the media and sometimes assisted decision-makers directly. The former Prime Minister told us, '…we would hear them. Sometimes we'd bring them into some of our advisory groups as well. There was formality, but there was also informality in those periods.'⁷⁹⁴

There were limits to what decision-makers knew or could know during the lockdown period in 2021. Although knowledge about the virus was by then much better than at the beginning of 2020, the virus continued to mutate in unpredictable ways. Moreover, knowledge about vaccines, their impact on transmission, and waning immunity, was still developing at the time and not necessarily available to decision-makers.

We heard that decision-makers wanted to model the effects of measures at a more fine-grained level than was possible. For example, they wanted estimates of the effects on infection rates of a gathering limit of 100 people compared to a limit of 200 people. This could have enabled them to choose a less restrictive approach if possible. However, we understand that the available epidemiological models were helpful for comparing broad scenarios, but uncertainties in the underlying assumptions meant they were not well-suited for analysis this detailed. We have observed that when there was uncertainty, decision-makers would take a precautionary approach, as the elimination strategy required.

Decision-makers regularly received advice on the impacts of lockdown restrictions on the country's economic output (GDP). They also considered data on the unemployment rate, traffic movement, heavy transport movement, card spending and business failures. Those indicators provided more real-time information than the big picture GDP assessments. Treasury forecasts through ordinary budget processes were also available to provide longer-term economic indicators.

While the Treasury was able to provide estimates on the impacts of restrictions on economic activity at stage 3 of Alert Level 3, they were unable to provide estimates of the impacts at stages 1 or 2 of Alert Level 3, or at the sub-regional level.⁷⁹⁵ Decision-makers have told us that, based on other information and experiences, they believed they had a good understanding of the different impacts occurring in sub-regional areas and at the different stages of Alert Level 3. Nevertheless, we consider this is data that decision-makers should have had when making alert level decisions. We discuss this further in section 2.4.7.4 below.

Ministers' personal experiences

Decision-makers also had their direct experience of lockdowns to draw on. Auckland-based ministers were, like many Aucklanders, working remotely and dealing with the restrictions on a day-to-day basis. Other ministers were from Auckland or had family in Auckland. As the former Prime Minister told us:

I think you never want a government governing by anecdata, but let's not discount the awareness that you build from the fact that the people that you are working with are there, and that your connections and community are there. And you see it in some of the decisions and the way that we were operating.⁷⁹⁶

Ministers had also learned a lot from their experiences in managing COVID-19 in 2020. Those experiences fall outside the scope of our Inquiry, but we know that they informed decision-making in 2021. Officials assessed that, having spent almost 18 months responding to the COVID-19 pandemic by the time of the Delta outbreak, decision-makers had a very clear view of costs and benefits of lockdown restrictions. This was put succinctly by one senior official: 'The Cabinet was not… blind to the economic consequences'.⁷⁹⁷

Engagements with Māori

We heard that officials and decision-makers sought input from Māori representatives throughout the pandemic response. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, when developing alert level Cabinet papers, consulted with Te Arawhiti and Te Puni Kōkiri. Both agencies had direct engagement with iwi and Māori and were able to convey some of their views. We have also seen in documents a particular focus on engagements to support and encourage vaccination uptake, more so than in relation to the lockdown restrictions.

We often saw in documents a recognition that locally-led responses, for example Māori for Māori responses, were the most effective in mitigating the impact of lockdowns on local communities. On the other hand, we are also aware of criticism of the Government's engagement with Māori during the 2021 lockdowns,⁷⁹⁸ including from the Waitangi Tribunal in relation to Cabinet's decision to rescind the 90 percent target.⁷⁹⁹

Engagements with the private sector, local government and community organisations

The Government worked with the private sector to establish formal stakeholder groups to advise on the COVID-19 response. These included two Ministerial Advisory Groups and the Business Leaders' Forum that provided advice to ministers, supported by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The former Minister for COVID-19 Response, Rt. Hon. Chris Hipkins told us that the feedback from these groups was valuable and had the benefit of being readily accessible: it was an efficient means of getting feedback on proposed decisions.⁸⁰⁰

By 2021, Ministers had developed relationships and were engaging directly with industry bodies, organisations, and individuals about the Government's COVID-19 response, and particularly in relation to how that response was affecting their portfolio areas. Publicly released Ministerial Diary Summaries show the extent of engagements.⁸⁰¹ Ministers often engaged through industry associations and peak bodies, such as Retail NZ and Hospitality New Zealand, which had both well-established histories of engaging with government and direct links to businesses.

The Minister of Finance, for example, described meeting regularly with the business community, unions, professional organisations and chambers of commerce. He heard about the supports they needed and the alert levels at which the Government should put those in place. Ministers, through direct engagements with business and community groups, also learned about the practical implications of alert level restrictions.

Ministers told us that the information they gained through these types of engagements did not appear in written papers but was often included in verbal reports given during Cabinet or Cabinet Committee meetings.

We acknowledge the efforts of decision-makers and agencies to inform themselves through engaging with affected parties. A Treasury briefing from 1 October 2021 proposed engaging with 'key external groups/individuals' to understand how businesses were situated, but noted challenges arising from fatigue in the business community.⁸⁰² Even so, some participants in Inquiry engagements forcefully told us that 'Wellington doesn't understand Auckland', and that high levels of engagement occurring in 2020 had dropped off in 2021.

Some people we spoke with thought that high-level economic data was informing government decisions, and this masked what was happening 'on the ground'. They felt that their efforts to demonstrate substantial impacts in Auckland failed because 'Wellington wasn't listening at all.'⁸⁰³

We heard from Auckland Council about the efforts they made to help implement alert level restrictions and mitigate some of their harmful impacts. Auckland Council played an important role in aiding community organisations to provide support. It also engaged with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet on how to make government communications appropriate for the Auckland audience.

Council staff established regular meetings with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the National Emergency Management Agency and other agencies. We heard there was also mayoral advocacy at the political level. Even so, council staff did not feel they were treated as a key stakeholder and had to draw information out from central government rather than receiving it proactively: 'it felt… a little bit one way at times'.⁸⁰⁴

In July 2021, the COVID-19 Group at the Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet established a Community Panel to provide feedback on aspects of the Government's COVID-19 response. The nine members of the Panel represented different sectors of the community.⁸⁰⁵ Decision-makers also heard directly from communities and the public, and picked up their views from media, social media and other sources.

As part of their role, politicians typically build a network of community contacts. One Minister described this as ranging from '…the local school to the relevant iwi, to the businesses, and their electorate...'⁸⁰⁶ She told us that all these contacts were sources of input into decisions, as ministers brought community voices to the table with them.⁸⁰⁷

Officials commissioned surveys and canvassed social media to understand public sentiment. Many of these reports are publicly available.⁸⁰⁸ This information, too, was available to and informed decision-makers. For example, decision-makers were highly cognisant of diminishing support as the Auckland lockdown went on, and this influenced some of their decisions (see section 2.4.10.3).

 

2.4.6.2 Advice on economic impacts of lockdowns

Ngā tohutohu ōhanga mō ngā pānga o ngā rāhui

Treasury advice in 2021 was that the fiscal response associated with lockdowns was prudent

Treasury advice on the Government's fiscal position was relevant to lockdown decisions because of the cost of economic supports provided by the Government when those decisions were in place. These supports were put in place both to mitigate the impacts of alert level restrictions and to encourage compliance with those restrictions. Decisions to extend lockdown restrictions extended the duration of economic supports.

Ministers were aware that the fiscal response to COVID-19 was causing net government debt to increase. Even so, Treasury advice was supportive of the economic measures that were in place, noting on more than one occasion that there were not any strong macroeconomic or fiscal reasons for reducing the level of fiscal support, given the benefits of maintaining certainty for businesses and individuals, and minimising hardship.⁸⁰⁹

The economy was expected to 'bounce back' quickly

While the lockdowns and associated public health measures in 2020 curtailed much economic activity, the subsequent loosening of restrictions led to a quick recovery, with the economy proving to be more resilient than predicted. An assumption that a similar recovery would follow the 2021 lockdown underpinned much of the economic advice given to decision-makers throughout 2021.

In November 2021, the Treasury continued to advise the Minister of Finance that they expected that pent-up demand and catch-up in deferred activity would drive a 'relatively swift recovery over the first half of 2022'.⁸¹⁰

The expectation of a bounce-back remained after the lockdown had ended. The Treasury Half Year Economic and Fiscal Update 2021,⁸¹¹ released on 15 December 2021, recorded an expectation that the Government's operating balance would return to surplus in 2023/24, with reasonable economic conditions (low unemployment, GDP growth, elevated commodity prices supporting exports), albeit in the context of expected higher inflation and interest rates.

Early advice stated that a strong health response was the best economic response

Early advice from the Minister for COVID-19 Response to Cabinet was that a strong health response was the best economic response. This was repeated in the Cabinet papers of 20, 23, 27 and 30 August, and 6 September. The 20 August 2021 paper set out the evidence officials considered supported that advice.

• New Zealand's infection and death rates were among the lowest in the world.
• New Zealand's unemployment rate was at the pre-COVID level of 4 percent, because jobs and businesses had been protected with the wage subsidy. Unemployment in New Zealand peaked at 5.3 percent (whereas in the United States and Canada it rose above 10 percent).
• Economic activity in the March 2021 quarter was 2.4 percent above the previous year.
• The Government was in a 'strong financial position' – net core Crown debt stood at 31.2 percent of GDP at the end of May 2021, 8.8 percent lower than the forecast 44 percent (a difference of approximately $40 billion). 'This gives us options to keep investing to protect New Zealanders and accelerate our recovery'.⁸¹²

An Appendix to that Cabinet paper provided additional information on how the New Zealand economy had rebounded above pre-COVID-19 levels after the 2020 Alert Level 4 lockdown had been lifted. New Zealand's economic growth was higher than in Australia and the United States in the same period, while the economies of the 'Euro area' and the United Kingdom had shrunk. The Appendix also noted that the International Monetary Fund had forecast that New Zealand's net public debt would 'remain considerably lower than our international counterparts'.

The Cabinet paper, while noting 'considerable uncertainty' as to the economic impacts of alert level restrictions, estimated the impact on New Zealand's GDP of various scenarios. The reduction in economic activity with all of New Zealand at Alert Level 4 would be $1,520 million per week or 25.3 percent of weekly GDP.⁸¹³ With Auckland at Alert level 4 and the rest of New Zealand at Alert Level 3 it would be $920 million per week or 15.3 percent of weekly GDP.

On 27 August 2021, Cabinet noted that economic impacts would differ across industries and within regions. Overall impact would depend significantly on any regional boundaries, which would impact supply chains. Hence, some estimates of the impact on GDP might be too low.⁸¹⁴

In addition to Cabinet papers, we have reviewed advice from the Treasury to the Minister of Finance. A Treasury aide memoire to the Minister of Finance on 19 August 2021 set out anticipated reductions in activity by industry. It emphasised 'the importance of a robust public health response to suppress the outbreak, that then allows for a de escalation in Alert Levels as quickly as possible'.⁸¹⁵ The Treasury's advice noted the inflationary risk of offering financial supports over an extended period but said this depended on the length of time spent at higher alert levels.⁸¹⁶

Advice from the Treasury to the Minister of Finance on 25 and 27 August 2021 considered strategy for the economic response to COVID-19.⁸¹⁷ The Treasury emphasised the need for funding to be targeted and time limited. It observed there might be a case to consider reducing the generosity of Wage Subsidy payments but advised there was 'considerable fiscal headroom' and that further economic support measures may be needed if alert level restrictions were maintained for a lengthy period.

On 3 September 2021, the Treasury advised the Minister of Finance that, although Auckland was expected to face the most severe restrictions, it did not recommend regional targeting of financial support for businesses.⁸¹⁸ The interconnected nature of New Zealand's economy meant restrictions in Auckland also impacted businesses throughout the country. Boundary effects would be felt nationally, and 'regional targeting also creates boundary and administrative issues for the management of the scheme'.⁸¹⁹

By this time, all of New Zealand other than Auckland was in Alert Level 2. Most economic advice continued to cover impacts on the country as a whole and not on Auckland separately. This included scenarios on aggregate national impacts of Auckland being at different alert levels from other parts of the country. That information being presented in an aggregate fashion, it did not separately assess flow-on effects of Auckland’s lockdown on neighbouring regions such as Northland and Waikato.

By mid-September 2021 economic advice was more cautious

The 13 September 2021 Cabinet paper noted that the Treasury had revised upwards its estimate of the reduction in national economic activity with Auckland at Alert Level 4.⁸²⁰ The paper did not consider the economic impact on Auckland separately.

For the first time since the beginning of the lockdown, the paper did not repeat that a strong health response is the best economic response. That statement did not reappear in alert level Cabinet papers. Even so, Ministers have told us that they continued to hold this view throughout the Auckland lockdown.

From 13 September, the Treasury began to increasingly emphasise the uncertainty as to the duration of the lockdown and its impacts, but this was not fully reflected in Cabinet papers. For example, the 13 September Cabinet paper noted that:

Previous lockdowns indicate that while activity does fall sharply at higher Alert Levels, a significant amount is deferred rather than lost, if the time spent under higher Alert Level restrictions is kept short ... bank economists expect that a short, sharp response will have a relatively small long-run impact on the economy.

However, the Treasury advised the Minister of Finance on 17 September, 'If Auckland stays at higher Alert Levels for a longer period [than the national lockdown in 2020], the recovery is likely to be pushed out further.' Treasury data foreshadowed 'a reasonably robust recovery, but the uncertainty around the length of lockdown restrictions means we cannot provide clear estimates of the path ahead at this time'.⁸²¹ The Treasury advised there were no 'strong macroeconomic or fiscal reasons for reducing the current level of fiscal support' but, given the uncertainty, recommended keeping the response under review.

Cabinet papers recorded the high-level economic impacts as alert level settings loosened from early October 2021

By early October, Cabinet was aware that the lockdown was not eliminating the outbreak. Economic assessments in Cabinet papers began to focus on a 'rebound' in Auckland after moving to Alert Level 3. The 4 October Cabinet paper said this was 'in line with the overall resilience seen across New Zealand's economy', citing a doubling of heavy traffic movements and a 60 percent increase in consumer spending.

The 4 October Cabinet paper set out the Treasury's estimate of the economic impact of the proposed changes to Alert Level 3 settings. Fully implemented, Alert Level 3 stage 3 would reduce the economic impact of Alert Level 3 in Auckland from $210 million per week (4 percent of national weekly GDP) to approximately $40 million per week (1 percent of weekly national GDP).

During the period 11 October to 22 November, Cabinet papers initially continued to describe Auckland as 'rebounding'. Evidence showed that conditions in Auckland had improved in Alert Level 3 compared with Alert Level 4, but electronic card spending⁸²² was still down from 2019 levels by almost 40 percent in the week ended 4 October 2021.⁸²³ This improved to a 24 percent reduction by the week ended 10 October 2021⁸²⁴ then declined again to a 31 percent reduction in the week ended 24 October 2021.⁸²⁵

A footnote in the Cabinet paper of 11 October 2021 explained that data available to the Treasury did not allow for estimates of sub-regional economic impacts, or for estimates of the impacts of stages 1 and 2 of Alert Level 3.⁸²⁶ Nevertheless, Heart of the City (Auckland’s city centre business association) was producing regional and sub-regional estimates of the impact on consumer spending and, at least on one occasion in November 2021, provided them to the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. Their data showed unusually adverse impacts on the Auckland region and city centre over the periods from mid-2019 to mid-2020 and from mid-2019 to mid-2021.⁸²⁷

By 1 November 2021, advice to Cabinet acknowledged 'a continued reduction in Auckland's activity'.⁸²⁸ It noted that 6,066 more people were on a main benefit nationally than before lockdown (down from 10,401 in the week of 17 September).⁸²⁹ The Cabinet paper advised that officials would provide further information on the overall economic impact of the lockdown on 15 November 2021.⁸³⁰

Cabinet decided to move Auckland to Alert Level 3.2 on 8 November 2021 on the advice of the Minister for COVID-19 Response who noted that this would increase economic activity. A footnote reiterated that 'the data currently available' did not allow for estimates of the economic impacts of intermediate steps within Alert Level 3.⁸³¹

On 22 November 2021, Cabinet delayed moving Auckland out of Alert Level 3.2 until the transition to the new framework in 10 days. The Cabinet paper provided a high-level overview of the estimated economic costs associated with the different levels of the COVID-19 Protection Framework compared with the Alert Level System.⁸³² It did not provide advice on the economic or other impacts of the delay.

Officials provided advice on the potential fiscal impacts of continuing measures to support employment

The Treasury and the Ministry of Social Development reported on a six-week review of the Wage Subsidy Scheme on 22 September 2021. Officials advised ministers that they did not consider there were any strong macroeconomic or fiscal reasons for reducing the level of fiscal support, given the benefits of maintaining certainty for businesses and individuals and minimising hardship.⁸³³

On 29 September 2021, the Treasury published its Statement on the Long-term Fiscal Position and Long-term Insights Briefing.⁸³⁴ The executive summary stated, 'While the fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic has caused net debt to increase significantly, the Treasury views this response and current debt levels to be prudent.' It noted uncertainty about the path of the economy through the COVID-19 pandemic and the uneven impacts of the epidemic across different industries and, as a result, on different subpopulations such as young people, Māori, Pacific peoples and women. It identified that a sharp increase in house prices was placing further pressure on intergenerational equity.

The Treasury also identified the risk of longer-lasting economic costs, particularly for those losing their job during the pandemic, but thought, given the small increase in unemployment and fast recovery from previous lockdowns, there was reason to be optimistic. It credited a strong fiscal response to COVID-19 for the country avoiding worse economic and fiscal outcomes. The Treasury forecast that New Zealand's public debt would peak at 48 percent of GDP in 2023. However, it noted that the fiscal response to COVID-19 was largely temporary, and fiscal deficits would shrink as the support ends.

The Treasury noted the Government's reasons for taking the view that current levels of debt were prudent and said it supported the Government's assessment. It further stated there was currently no need to reduce debt levels.⁸³⁵

A Treasury briefing to the Minister of Finance on 1 October 2021 considered the proposed three stages of Alert Level 3 and how they might impact economic supports.⁸³⁶ The Treasury noted that 'if Alert Level 3 restrictions currently in place are significantly loosened, then the Wage Subsidy revenue decline test will appropriately limit scheme expenditure in the near term (payments 4-6) as economic activity lifts.' However, the Treasury highlighted a risk that, if loosened restrictions remained in place for a prolonged period, there would not be a clear trigger for scheme deactivation and expenditure issues could arise.

On 2 November 2021, the Treasury and the Ministry of Social Development provided their respective ministers with a six-week review of the Wage Subsidy Scheme.⁸³⁷ They considered that the overall objectives of supporting the public health response and reducing the social and economic disruption of outbreaks, including by the Wage Subsidy Scheme, remained appropriate under Alert Levels 3 and 4.

However, they advised of significant uncertainty around the macroeconomic situation. There was a risk that the economic outlook could worsen:

if it takes longer than expected to vaccinate a sufficient portion of the population, border restrictions take longer to ease than currently forecast, or the behavioural response to the new strategy reduces the speed of the economic bounce-back. Public health restrictions remaining in place in Auckland for an extended period increases the likelihood of firm failures, higher unemployment and lower business investment.⁸³⁸

The Treasury and the Ministry of Social Development recommended keeping the Wage Subsidy Scheme available for a further six weeks. Although noting that increasing the level of support provided through the Resurgence Support Payment risked compounding inflationary pressures, officials advised that the Wage Subsidy Scheme 'has in-built fiscal controls which limit the risk of overstimulating the economy somewhat'.

On 12 November 2021, the Treasury briefed the Minister of Finance concerning the future of economic supports under the new COVID-19 Protection Framework.⁸³⁹ It stated that fiscal support had mitigated the impact of constrained demand but noted that it had 'recently cautioned against increasing the level of COVID economic support to avoid compounding macroeconomic pressures'. It flagged 'considerable uncertainty in the economic outlook'; in particular, it was unknown how the economy would respond to the transition to the new Framework. Inflationary pressures could increase 'as people emerge from lockdown' but consumer behaviour would be impacted by increased prevalence of the virus in the community. The Treasury recommended 'maintaining flexibility to tailor economic support to outcomes'.⁸⁴⁰

The Treasury provided advice on the impacts of internal and external border restrictions on supply chains

The Treasury noted in a briefing to the Minister of Finance on 5 November 2021 that Auckland border restrictions had had implications for the rest of the country, due to the volume of intermediate goods produced or warehoused in Auckland. Freight volumes between Auckland and the rest of the country had recovered since the move to Alert Level 3 but remained significantly lower than prior to the Delta outbreak.

The Treasury also noted that consumer prices were continuing to rise strongly, with global shipping prices a particular contributor. It focused on impacts on the national economy but noted that sustained high import volumes and freight backlogs were putting pressure on the containerised supply chain in Auckland, and pressure would continue to mount until Auckland retail activity recovered to outpace new imports.

The Treasury expected the transition to the COVID-19 Protection Framework to reduce the likelihood of lockdowns and therefore lower the risk of disruption at ports and to the wider supply chain. It expected greater inward migration in 2022 to alleviate labour shortages. However, '[t]he longer disruption persists, the greater the risk that international trade becomes less globalised and New Zealand loses important connections'.

In mid-November officials advised on the cumulative economic effects of lockdowns over the previous three months

In its briefing to the Minister of Finance on 12 November 2021, the Treasury estimated that, between 17 August 2021 and 5 November 2021, the cumulative economic impact of alert level restrictions on Auckland was around $4.5 billion (approximately 5.6 percent of expected national GDP over the period). For the rest of New Zealand, the estimated economic impact was around $3.4 billion (approximately 4.2 percent). As of 10 November, $4 billion had been paid out from the Wage Subsidy Scheme and $1.4 billion in Resurgence Support Payments. A significant proportion of this had gone to firms in Auckland. The Government had also provided significant support through other targeted schemes and programmes such as the Tourism Communities Package, the Regional Business Partner Network and support for the events sector.⁸⁴¹

The Cabinet paper of 15 November 2021 addressed the cumulative impact of the past three months at elevated alert levels.⁸⁴² It stated that 'New Zealand's economic performance continues to reflect that the economy has been resilient during the COVID-19 pandemic.' However, alert level restrictions since the beginning of the Delta outbreak had come at an economic cost, particularly for regions and sectors most impacted by them. GDP losses would have occurred even without alert level restrictions, as people adjusted their behaviour in response to what likely would have been a more severe outbreak. The Treasury expected the current outbreak and restrictions to continue to dampen activity over the remainder of 2021, with a strong rebound in the first half of 2022. 'However, significant uncertainty remains regarding these forecasts.'⁸⁴³

The paper reported 'an estimated economic cost of almost $8b and a reduction in expected GDP for the current lockdown of around 10%.'⁸⁴⁴ This was worse than August estimates of the impact of having the whole country at Alert Level 3 for 15 weeks.

High-level indicators showed a resilient economy during the lockdown

Although there was some short-run volatility,⁸⁴⁵ high-level indicators in 2021 pointed to a resilient and growing economy. Annual data showed that the national level GDP growth, while slowing, remained strong at 6.3 percent (June), 5.5 percent (September) and 5.8 percent (December). The national unemployment rate decreased from 4 percent to 3.2 percent in the second half of 2021.⁸⁴⁶ Despite the extended lockdown at the end of the year, Auckland also continued to grow, though at a lower rate relative to the wider economy.⁸⁴⁷ Regional GDP data has shown that Auckland's annual growth was 5.4 percent in June 2021, 5 percent in September 2021 and 5.7 percent in December 2021.⁸⁴⁸

We have not seen any obvious signs of decline in high-level economic indicators that decision-makers should have been concerned about when making key lockdown decisions in the second half of 2021. Consistent with this, the Treasury's forecasts at the end of December 2021 did not signal serious concerns. For the year ending June 2022, the December 2021 Half Year Economic and Fiscal Update forecast GDP growth of 0.8 percent, unemployment of 3.2 percent, and net core debt of 37.6 percent of GDP.⁸⁴⁹ The equivalent actual figures for the year ending June 2021 were: GDP growth of 5.1 percent, unemployment 4 percent and net core debt of 30.1 percent of GDP.

The most significant change was an increase in inflation – from 3.3 percent in June 2021 to 5.9 percent in December 2021.⁸⁵⁰ The Reserve Bank increased the Official Cash Rate in October 2021 (from 0.25 percent to 0.5 percent), with another small increase to 0.75 percent in November 2021. In December 2021, the Treasury forecast Consumers Price Index (CPI) inflation of 5.1 percent for the year ending June 2022.⁸⁵¹ Inflation went on to peak at 7.3 percent in June 2022.

The Treasury's advice throughout the second half of 2021 noted the risk of inflation, often in the context of international economic conditions and supply chain disruption. However, although the Treasury and Ministry of Social Development flagged that providing financial supports risked compounding inflationary pressures, their advice nevertheless was that, on balance, it was appropriate to 'stay the course'.⁸⁵² Decision-makers followed that advice.

 

2.4.6.3 Advice on social and educational impacts of lockdowns

Ngā tohutohu mō ngā pānga pāpori, mātauranga hoki o ngā rāhui

Cabinet papers gave summaries of social impacts of lockdowns

Cabinet papers primarily considered the social impacts of lockdowns by reference to 'at-risk populations', one of eight factors Cabinet had agreed to consider in relation to alert level decisions (see Appendix 2). Reference to another factor, 'public attitudes and compliance', also sometimes covered social impacts.

Advice on social impacts in the body of Cabinet papers was usually brief. Appendices then described high-level impacts on at-risk populations: Māori, Pacific peoples, disabled people, ethnic communities, low-income households and individuals, older people, young people and, later, people experiencing family violence or sexual violence. They typically provided a snapshot of the current state and did not usually explain in detail how impacts were being managed or how they could evolve.⁸⁵³

For example, the Cabinet paper of 27 August 2021 noted: '[a]lthough higher Alert Levels assist in preventing community transmission in more vulnerable communities, they disproportionately impact some groups. The impacts on at-risk populations are set out in more detail in Appendix 3 …'⁸⁵⁴ The list of impacts was followed by a statement that they were being managed by government agencies and social service providers.

Appendices highlighted the disproportionate representation of Māori and Pacific peoples in case numbers and their susceptibility to the worst health effects of the virus. The Cabinet paper of 27 August 2021 noted challenges around vaccinations for Pacific communities and increased racial discrimination against them.⁸⁵⁵ The Cabinet paper of 30 August summarised engagements in Northland and noted declining resilience in some Māori communities, as well as increasing demand for food and housing support.⁸⁵⁶ The 6 September paper noted that agencies were reporting increased need among vulnerable people for food, with high demand for food banks and food grants.⁸⁵⁷

The 13 September 2021 Cabinet paper advised that agencies were reporting challenges with education, increased discrimination towards Pacific and disabled people, and increased demand for mental health support services.⁸⁵⁸ The appendix recorded:

• serious adverse impacts on Māori businesses in Auckland, both their immediate resiliency and future capabilities. 'Muted business signals, lack of interruption insurance, supply chain issues and growing inflation are decreasing Māori business' financial reserves and recovery capabilities'
• reductions in Pacific peoples' earning capacity, caused by lockdown restrictions and amplifying income and poverty inequities. Food security and financial struggles continued to be key issues
• Pacific peoples faced challenges meeting the criteria to access support (for example, food parcels, financial support)
• young people were struggling with mental health and isolation, online learning and the uncertainty of post-lockdown return to school. Those looking towards tertiary education were missing out on university open days and face-to-face meetings
• in the previous week, Youthline had the highest number of incidents reported in the year so far, including 64 events related to suicide.

The Cabinet paper of 20 September 2021 noted that a shift to Alert Level 3 in Auckland was likely to alleviate some concerns around social impacts.⁸⁵⁹ It repeated earlier high-level summaries regarding at-risk populations.⁸⁶⁰ The appendix reiterated the issues identified in the 13 September paper and added details on Māori accessing Jobseeker Work Ready Support (an increase of 3.2% on the previous month) and Special Needs Grants for food (an increase of 38.3% on July). It also noted that communities were supporting Cook Islanders unable to get home due to closed borders, as they were ineligible for government support.

The Cabinet paper of 4 October 2021, which recommended three new stages for Alert Level 3, briefly set out impacts on at-risk populations. The appendix, for example, described impacts on Māori, 'with existing educational disparities being exacerbated because of continued lack of access to school, variable access to connectivity and digital devices, and overcrowding in some households'. It noted that compensating strategies would need to form a key part of the post-lockdown response; local responses were known to be most effective for Māori.⁸⁶¹

The appendix also stated that:

Continued Alert Level 3 restrictions in Tāmaki Makaurau are weakening Māori business resiliency and future capabilities. There are concerns about their ability and resources to "bounce-back" and resume operations at Level 3 and lower. … Tied to business strains are the increasing indicators of Māori unemployment …

The Minister for COVID-19 Response advised Cabinet that 'Modifying Alert Level 3 settings in Auckland over coming weeks is likely to alleviate many of these [social impact] issues.'⁸⁶²

Cabinet papers from 11 October 2021 continued to report impacts on at-risk populations, though significantly reduced in length and detail compared with earlier papers and often repeating earlier assessments.⁸⁶³ The 11 October paper noted 'concerns' regarding the social impact of enduring alert level restrictions, particularly on at-risk populations.⁸⁶⁴ It noted a further increase in the number of incidents reported to Youthline over the past week.

The Cabinet paper of 8 November 2021 (recommending moving Auckland to Alert Level 3.2) noted that '[i]mpacts reported as part of previous Alert Level reviews continue to persist'.⁸⁶⁵ It reported increasing calls to Youthline in Auckland and Northland, with the top two issues continuing to be suicide and depression/sadness. The paper also specifically noted anxiety and issues with mask wearing for disabled people.

A Cabinet paper from the Minister of Finance on 4 November 2021⁸⁶⁶ recommended that the Wage Subsidy Scheme should continue to be made available for a further six weeks from 11 November. The paper noted broad-based uptake of the Wage Subsidy Scheme across sectors and regions, reflecting the specific locations of restrictions; this pattern was expected to continue. Women, Māori and Pacific communities made up a significant proportion of workers in some of the most affected sectors, and agencies were working with these communities to improve accessibility to the subsidy and support employers to apply.

It noted that the wage subsidy would be available to registered charities, incorporated societies and non-government organisations who met the eligibility criteria.

Many of these organisations are relied upon by vulnerable groups including disabled people and those with health conditions. Ensuring the viability of such organisations … will be crucial to the ongoing servicing of these population groups.⁸⁶⁷

The Cabinet paper of 15 November 2021 contained 'a broad assessment of cumulative impact of three months of lockdown in Auckland (and to a lesser extent, around the country)'.⁸⁶⁸ A summary of social impacts briefly highlighted pressure on emergency housing (comparing a 64 percent increase in the number of Auckland households in emergency housing with a 29 percent increase nationally), mental health concerns and contacts with Youthline.⁸⁶⁹ A high-level summary of impacts on at-risk populations specifically noted the significant social implications of long-term lockdown on Pacific people, 'a relationship community', with the loss of connectedness and positive wellbeing.⁸⁷⁰

The 29 November 2021 Cabinet paper considered impacts on at-risk populations and iwi of the proposed initial settings of the COVID-19 Protection Framework.⁸⁷¹ It briefly noted that moving to the Framework would 'alleviate some of the pressures experienced by youth, disabled and older people to date due to lockdowns, such as isolation'.⁸⁷²

Cabinet papers regularly reported on social licence for lockdown measures

Cabinet papers regularly focused on social licence and whether people were favourable towards the COVID-19 response. They summarised police activity and overall compliance with restrictions. The 6 September 2021 paper noted protest activity, increasing non-compliance, disorder and aggression at supermarkets and 'lockdown measures exacerbating issues for those experiencing mental health issues and substance abuse'.⁸⁷³ It also noted 'indications of fatigue' and 'a slight increase in negative sentiment on social media'.⁸⁷⁴ While business sentiment was more positive than during the 2020 lockdown, 'with the lengthening of the lockdown period, many small business owners are feeling anxious, as they are having to factor in the compounding impact of a lack of skilled staff'.⁸⁷⁵

The Cabinet paper of 15 November 2021 noted indications in Auckland and Northland of increased unrest and distrust of government by Māori. Balancing the protection of a low vaccinated population and the need to open access to employment and education had increased the tension. The paper stated, '[w]e know that locally led responses for Māori by Māori are most effective and can help to overcome distrust of government agencies'.⁸⁷⁶

Ministers also learned of the social impacts of lockdowns in other ways

In addition to what was presented in alert level Cabinet papers, Ministers received information about the impacts of their decisions on social division, disruption and isolation in a number of other ways.

For example, when deciding on social supports, the relevant Cabinet papers advised Ministers about pressures around access to food and other essential items and services. They also received advice about the increased risk of family and sexual violence, and impacts on mental health for youth. Cabinet papers cited a 'Rapid Evidence Review' by the Ministry of Social Development from 2020 on social and psychosocial impacts of COVID-19 in New Zealand.⁸⁷⁷ The Review had found (among other things) that:

• the psychological impacts of quarantine and self-isolation include Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, depression, stress and anxiety
• loneliness (likely to increase while at Alert Level 4) can increase morbidity and mortality, depression and anxiety, and can impair cognitive performance
• people living in crowded households during lockdown may be at risk of poor mental health outcomes and increased family conflict and violence
• the likelihood of negative psychological effects may be exacerbated by additional stressors including financial loss, longer quarantine duration, infection fears, frustration, inadequate supplies and inadequate information
• increases in unemployment are likely to lead to increases in material hardship and delays in realising previous aspirations (such as home ownership, starting a family), which may lead to poorer mental health
• school closures and restrictions on movements disrupt children's social supports, and mean the loss of a key protective factor against disadvantage and exposure to violence. Many of the psychosocial impacts on children are likely to manifest in the medium and long term rather than during a four-week Level 4 lockdown period
• both the immediate and medium-term impacts of COVID-19 will be particularly severe for population groups already experiencing disadvantage and risk compounding existing socioeconomic divides
• a one-size-fits-all response to the pandemic may serve to exacerbate persistent health and socioeconomic inequities.

The Police were updating decision-makers on levels of non-compliance with restrictions, as well as details of any protest actions, both of which informed them as to social division and disruption.

Cabinet papers provided advice on the impacts of lockdowns on education

Earlier Cabinet papers did not provide extended analysis of the impacts of lockdown decisions on education. However, they did note disproportionately adverse impacts of distance learning on specific groups of students.

Hesitancy around returning to school due to fear of infection was flagged in September 2021 (when most of the country shifted down to Alert Level 2) and continued to be a particular concern. While ministers wished to reduce as far as possible the disruption to education, they were aware that parents and family members were not always supportive of children returning to school as they were afraid of virus transmission.

Alert level Cabinet papers first provided a substantive analysis of the impacts on education about four weeks after New Zealand moved into Alert Level 4.⁸⁷⁸ The 13 September 2021 paper reported:

increasing challenges associated with education – digital connectedness and accessing school resources, mixed levels of engagement with distance learning, and deepening concerns about return to school hesitancy and participation levels when they can return to onsite learning.⁸⁷⁹

The paper identified specific concerns for Māori learners. It also noted that long lockdowns could disadvantage Pacific learners in assessments and exacerbate wellbeing issues.

The Cabinet paper of 4 October 2021, about the timing for reopening Auckland's schools, identified the social cost for learners of not returning to school.⁸⁸⁰ On 8 November 2021, Cabinet considered a paper from the Minister of Education regarding increasing onsite education in Alert Level 3.⁸⁸¹ The paper noted that the majority of children were participating in their education by distance, and that this had particular negative impacts for Māori and Pacific children, as well as those living in disadvantaged households with inequitable access to connectivity and devices.

The Cabinet paper of 8 November detailed adverse impacts of lockdowns on education. Overseas evidence showed that long periods away from schooling increased the risk of disengagement from learning and of students falling behind in their learning. Principals in Auckland were reporting falling levels of engagement with distance learning as the time away from school increased. Students were also missing the benefits of culturally sustaining activities.

The paper cited a 3 November 2021 public health risk assessment which 'concluded that the public health risks of re-opening schools [in Alert Level 3] are outweighed by the benefits'. Cabinet agreed that face-to-face learning would be offered, subject to certain conditions, to students in years 0 to 10 from 17 November 2021.

The Cabinet paper of 15 November 2021 described impacts of lockdowns on education. It noted disengagement of learners, lower educational attainment and frustration of staff, learners and parents.⁸⁸² Providers, unions and students had advised the Ministry that lockdowns had had a significant impact on many students' ability to undertake or complete their studies.

On 2 December 2021, New Zealand moved to the COVID-19 Protection Framework, with the intention that schools, kura and early learning services would largely remain open for face-to-face teaching and learning. The Framework applied to early learning services immediately and to schools in Term 1, 2022.⁸⁸³

2.4.6.4 Advice on international pandemic experiences

Ngā tohutohu mō ngā wheako o te ao whānui i te mate urutā

 
Over the period from August to December 2021, officials regularly advised the Minister for COVID-19 Response and Cabinet on international developments relevant to their decisions to continue or exit from lockdowns, and the conditions for doing so. This was primarily in the form of the weekly reports provided to COVID-19 Ministers.

We heard that decision-makers were closely monitoring the approaches in other countries, with modelling provided to show how such approaches might play out in New Zealand. We also heard about the networks and relationships that allowed information to be obtained from other jurisdictions. For example, the Minister of Finance had regular meetings with his counterparts from Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Similar meetings took place between senior officials from New Zealand and other countries.

On 20 August 2021, officials advised the Minister for COVID-19 Response that, globally, more COVID-19 cases were reported in the first five months of 2021 than all of 2020. Inadequate testing and low vaccination rates were 'exacerbating disease transmission and overwhelming local health systems, leaving the world vulnerable to new variants'.⁸⁸⁴

A Cabinet paper for 23 August advised that Australian states were experiencing different outcomes depending on how quickly they introduced restrictions.⁸⁸⁵ Many countries had high numbers of daily cases and deaths, even with high vaccination rates, and continued to use significant domestic restrictions. The United Kingdom and Germany had relaxed some domestic restrictions but also experienced adverse health consequences.

The weekly report of 1 October 2021 to the Minister for COVID-19 Response described the experiences of eight countries.⁸⁸⁶ With widespread vaccine distribution, more were moving to 'living-with-COVID' models and easing domestic restrictions despite ongoing transmission.

Countries continued to use public health measures alongside vaccination to maintain relatively low case numbers. Scotland and Denmark introduced domestic vaccine passes as a condition of entry to certain settings. Ireland continued to use limits on gatherings.

Countries with low vaccination rates (such as Chile, South Africa, Serbia) had increased daily cases. The Netherlands (35 percent vaccinated) eased restrictions, had a spike in cases (from 589 to 10,000 in a month), reintroduced restrictions, reduced them in the face of outrage from hospitality and entertainment providers, as well as the broader public – then reintroduced them after several clusters emerged.

Prior to the 11 October 2021 decision to keep Auckland at Alert Level 3.1, officials advised the Minister for COVID-19 Response on international developments through the weekly report of 8 October.⁸⁸⁷ The report noted that the first stage of the New South Wales plan for easing lockdown restrictions would come into effect when 70 percent of the eligible population was vaccinated – projected to occur on 11 October. This stage would lift stay-at-home orders. The second stage would ease or remove many capacity limits on venues and facilities and would come into effect when 80 percent of the eligible population was vaccinated.

To help with the design of the new Framework, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet briefed the Prime Minister on 10 October 2021 on international developments:

[r]ecent transmission dynamics in Victoria and Singapore […] are evidence of the continuing value of a cautious approach. Many other countries demonstrate that high rates of vaccination and naturally acquired immunity are insufficient to avoid ongoing illness and death and restrictions for society and the economy.⁸⁸⁸

The Department advised that '[r]ecent experiences in previously "low COVID countries" would suggest caution in adopting an approach which tolerates (or is seen to tolerate) new cases.'⁸⁸⁹ New South Wales, Victoria and Singapore had had negative results despite high and increasing rates of vaccination and public health measures broadly similar to Alert Level 3 controls.

All these examples have greater health system capacity, suggesting that similar trajectories in New Zealand may lead to more severe outcomes for the worst affected and unvaccinated, and with greater risk of displacing other health services.⁸⁹⁰

The 14 October 2021 Public Health Risk Assessment (which was intended to inform alert level recommendations of 18 October 2021) included a cautionary '[c]omparison with Victoria … – [a] real world example of our possible future'.⁸⁹¹ Exponential growth in case numbers had occurred earlier in the Delta outbreak when restrictions were eased ('to a far greater extent than a transition from AL4 to AL3') and then reinstated. The Ministry of Health said this trajectory 'shows how rapidly the situation can escalate, despite appearing under control for almost 3 weeks'. It was a warning that 'once [D]elta is embedded, reintroduction of restrictions may not be able to mitigate its growth.'

The 1 November 2021 Cabinet paper (which advised keeping Auckland at Alert Level 3.1) compared the Auckland Delta outbreak with the Victoria outbreak and how rapidly case numbers in Victoria had increased once restrictions were eased when the outbreak appeared under control.

The weekly report to the Minister for COVID-19 Response on 5 November 2021 provided information on the United Kingdom, which was planning an exit strategy. It had high vaccination rates (79 percent), continuing high daily cases and decreasing numbers of deaths. Levels of vaccine-induced immunity were waning, which may have been keeping the daily case numbers high.⁸⁹²

The report showed that Singapore, with high vaccination rates (84 percent) was seeing a steep rise in daily cases after loosening restrictions in August 2021, with rising daily deaths and increasing hospitalisations. Half of Singapore's general hospitalisations and two thirds of its intensive-care patients were unvaccinated; most were over 60 years of age. Singapore had reinstated restrictions.

Overall, the information provided to Ministers allowed them to understand the experiences of other countries and how the virus was changing. The information presented to Ministers about overseas experiences emphasised the risk of high transmission in populations with lower rates of vaccinations and supported taking a cautious approach to transition to the new Framework.

2.4.7 Our assessment of the advice provided on impacts of key decisions

Tā mātou aromatawai i ngā tohutohu me ngā pārongo i tukuna mō ngā pānga o ngā whakatau matua

2.4.7.1 Overall, decision-makers were sufficiently informed, but the advice and information provided to decision-makers had some limitations

Ahakoa i rawaka te pārongo i whiwhi ai ngā kaiwhakatau, i kitea tonu ētahi herenga i roto i ngā tohutohu me ngā pārongo i tukuna

 
Decision-makers were receiving a wide range of information from many varied sources. We acknowledge that they sought and considered extensive information about the virus, the pandemic and the lockdowns, and how they were affecting New Zealanders.

Decision-makers and officials have told us that they were well aware of the significant social and economic disruption that was occurring because of lockdown decisions. We have also reviewed, in the available documentary evidence, the information on those matters provided to decision-makers (as described in section 2.4.6). We conclude that the key decisions on lockdowns during the period 17 August to 2 December 2021 were sufficiently informed as to the main impacts of those decisions.

While we consider that decision-makers were sufficiently informed, we see room for more structured provision and recording of robust information on impacts. This would improve transparency and give greater confidence in decision-making. We identify below some ways to improve the information available for making decisions.

2.4.7.2 Decision-makers relied on information that was not captured in Cabinet papers  

I whakawhirinaki ngā kaiwhakatau ki ētahi pārongo kāore i kapi ki ngā pepa o Te Rūnanga Minita

 
Our view that decision-makers were sufficiently informed is based on evidence that they received wide-ranging information from a number of different sources in addition to the information contained in Cabinet papers prepared for alert level decisions. Those Cabinet papers, on their own, did not contain sufficient information to inform decision-makers about the social and economic impacts of lockdown decisions (we explore the reasons for this assessment in more detail below).

The diversity of information sources means there is not a clear or single record of all the key information on social and economic impacts that was brought to bear in relation to each alert level decision. This is in no small part due to the emergency context, which required iterative and fast-paced decision-making. However, best practice and accordingly the normal expectation is that papers seeking decisions (most commonly Cabinet papers) capture the most important considerations and contain sufficient information to inform decision-makers.

While Cabinet (or other decision-makers) will bring other information to bear in making a decision, the core advice should identify the main factors and evidence to consider. Where this is lacking, it puts more load on decision-makers to draw from their wider knowledge, and balance factors for themselves, on an impromptu basis. This is sometimes unavoidable, particularly in an emergency context, and sometimes decision-makers' expertise is sufficient to navigate gaps. Even so, it increases the risk that decisions are made without consideration of important factors, or without a proper record that all relevant factors, and no irrelevant factors, were taken into account.

A further risk is that the informal and unrecorded nature of some of the information considered by decision-makers has the potential to detract from the quality of decision-making process. It does not allow for a structured assessment of options, for example. It also creates issues around transparency and accountability because, as noted above, there is no complete enduring record of the basis on which decisions were made.

Acknowledging that it may not always be possible in an emergency to follow the ordinary processes for developing Cabinet papers, in Part 3 we suggest some ways to strengthen decision-making in a future pandemic – see Lesson One.

2.4.7.3 Cabinet papers provided more information about the health impacts than about the economic and social impacts of decisions

I nui ake te pārongo mō ngā pānga hauora i roto i ngā pepa o Te Rūnanga Minita, i ērā mō ngā pānga ōhanga, pāpori hoki o ngā whakatau

 
It is usual practice (as reflected in Cabinet Office guidance) for Cabinet papers to present a proposal (or options), along with an assessment of impacts and, if necessary, mitigation strategies for those impacts.⁸⁹³ In the context of lockdown decisions this requirement applies as much to economic and social impacts as to health impacts and, with as much rigour and specificity as possible, so that decision-makers have a good understanding of the consequences of their decisions.

As described in section 2.4.6, Cabinet papers provided decision-makers with mostly high-level and/or qualitative descriptions of the economic and social impacts of lockdowns, for example GDP lost each week at various alert levels.⁸⁹⁴ We did not observe detailed modelling of the impacts of proposed extensions or ending of lockdowns on economic and social outcomes in the Cabinet papers.

In contrast, every Cabinet paper included detailed information from modelling about the expected effect of alert level restrictions on case numbers. Indeed, from mid-October 2021, case numbers and effective reproduction numbers were forecast out to the end of the year, with results mapped against them to show whether actual numbers were following pessimistic, middle or optimistic forecasts. In mid-November, this was expanded to include forecast numbers of hospitalisations and Intensive Care Unit admissions.

We consider, for example, that the Cabinet decision on 18 October 2021 to adopt a 90 percent vaccination target for the transition to the COVID-19 Protection Framework required additional modelling of economic and social impacts. Decision-makers received clear modelling of the health benefits of the target but, other than previously provided estimates of weekly losses in GDP (which were not presented in the Cabinet paper proposing the target but appeared in an alert level Cabinet paper considered on the same date), did not have data on the economic and social impacts of retaining lockdown restrictions for the time it would take to reach that target.

By 2021, New Zealand had experience of lockdowns, and agencies had time to develop a more meaningful framework for assessing and monitoring impacts. This would have supported them to better assess the potential impacts of a lockdown, to monitor them during a lockdown, and to advise on the need for further mitigations or longer-term recovery support.

The absence of such a framework and related data gave decision-makers an unbalanced picture: they saw clearly the significant adverse health outcomes that lockdown restrictions would avoid, but they did not have clear or detailed forecasts of the adverse economic or social impacts of lockdowns.

Consistent with our observations, Phase One of this Inquiry commented on the strong focus in Cabinet papers on health impacts and weaker attention to economic and social impacts during 2020 and 2021:

One senior Minister told us that, without broader advice that took account of wider considerations beyond health objectives, they felt ill-equipped to make any decision not recommended by health experts. This is not to say that advice on the broader impacts was never given, but it was not consistent or prioritised.⁸⁹⁵

Capacity to access timely data and to model and advise on economic and social impacts takes time and resources to develop. That said, some data that might have enabled modelling of economic and social outcomes to inform Cabinet was available. For example, the Treasury provided information to the Minister of Finance about the cost of economic supports, including the industries that were most reliant on those supports, and this was used to project ongoing costs of supports as the lockdown restrictions went on.⁸⁹⁶ The focus, however, was not on impacts.

We have identified projects that government agencies and other researchers undertook on COVID-19-related topics during 2020 and 2021, using data from Stats NZ's Integrated Data Infrastructure. This suggests they were able to investigate a range of economic and social impacts of the response measures and mitigations that could have informed Cabinet decision-making at the time. We investigate how to build better data and modelling capacity in Part 3.

2.4.7.4 The advice provided to decision-makers about measuring impacts had limitations

He herenga tō ngā tohutohu i tukuna ki ngā kaiwhakatau mō te ine i ngā pānga

 
We have described how officials regularly reported the economic impacts of lockdowns and shifts in alert levels, particularly in terms of effects on the country's GDP. Economic advisers to governments typically track GDP as a standard measure of economic activity that reflects changes in business activity, employment, incomes and consumption. Changes in GDP have broad implications for government finances, and so the resources that it will likely have available to put in place protective measures in a pandemic. However, GDP by itself does not inform decision-makers on all aspects of the economic (or social) impacts of lockdowns.

Additional economic information was also provided to Cabinet, including levels of electronic card spending and light and heavy traffic in affected regions. Alert level Cabinet papers also referenced uptake of the Wage Subsidy Scheme, benefits and food grants, which informed decision-makers as to economic impacts. Other than food grants (a percentage of which was identified as arising in Auckland), this information was given on a national basis. However, information provided in an aggregate, nationwide form does not adequately capture the experiences of businesses and individuals in an affected area.

This reinforces the importance of more detailed measuring and modelling of impacts, as discussed above.

The Treasury could not provide estimates of economic impacts at a sub-regional level (see section 2.4.6.2). We consider this to be a notable limitation in the context of regional lockdowns. As explained elsewhere, efforts on the part of agencies and decision-makers meant there were means by which decision-makers were informed as to some sub-regional impacts in a qualitative manner. What we consider was lacking, however, was quantitative data equivalent to that which was provided to decision-makers at a national and (sometimes) regional level. The Treasury does not appear to have used information resources held by regional entities, such as local government and economic development agencies to obtain that data.

We were told that the economic impacts of the Auckland lockdown were felt differently in different areas, and by different industries. For example, data provided by Heart of the City demonstrates the significant downturn in the central city area compared to the rest of Auckland. Some of this data was provided to decision-makers by Heart of the City. However, we think it would be preferable for it to be sourced by government agencies and included in their advice, as well as in Cabinet papers for lockdown decisions.

A further limitation we have identified is that there was not data available for the Treasury to be able to estimate the economic impacts of the first two stages of Alert Level 3. The data was able to be provided for stage 3, but that stage was not reached. We believe decision-makers should always be provided data relating to the restrictions they are considering imposing. Auckland was subject to restrictions under stages 1 and 2 of Alert Level 3 from 5 October 2021 to 2 December 2021. While other relevant economic information was provided to decision-makers, which we have found was ultimately sufficient, this is a significant period of time not to have precise data.

Most social impacts were presented in Cabinet papers at a high level, noting only 'increased need', 'increasing challenges' or 'ongoing concerns'. The advice was also repetitive and did not clearly identify changes in impacts and circumstances or cumulative impacts.

It is not easy to consistently measure impacts such as social division, disruption and isolation. The kinds of data that could inform decision-makers about these impacts include:

• impacts on the restricted population's mental health – Cabinet papers sometimes used calls to mental health support lines as an indicator, for example
• impacts on school attendance – absenteeism figures, for example, including in relation to online learning
• impacts on lower-income families and individuals – for example, numbers of people accessing unemployment and other benefits; numbers of people accessing food grants or parcels; numbers of people in emergency housing
• numbers of people raising complaints or concerns with authorities such as the Human Rights Commissioner⁸⁹⁷
• sentiment research. This was undertaken during the lockdown but, for the most part, was conducted at a national level. Decision-makers should have results for any region under lockdown, compared to the rest of the country⁸⁹⁸
• other relevant measures of activity. For example, we understand that foot traffic in Central Business Districts in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch was able to be measured by officials when the COVID-19 Protection Framework was in place, to assess the pandemic's impact and recovery. This could also be a useful metric when lockdown restrictions are being used.

While some of this data or information sometimes appeared in Cabinet papers, metrics like this would ideally have been:

• included in Cabinet papers regularly or consistently to allow assessment of changes or trends from week to week
• presented as raw numbers as well as percentage changes, to allow better understanding of the impacts
• provided for the regions under lockdown as well as on a national basis
• compared to metrics from before lockdown, to help assess the extent and speed of any changes. Divisions and hardships existed in New Zealand prior to COVID-19 but decision-makers needed to understand the extent to which lockdowns exacerbated them.

We acknowledge it is possible that government agencies or third parties supplied information of this nature to individual ministers, but alert level Cabinet papers do not document this. Given the intense burden officials were working under when the pressure was at its worst, some may regard these points as a counsel of perfection. However, the importance of detailed intelligence for decision-makers cannot be overstated, especially when making a series of decisions where impacts are likely to accumulate over time.

2.4.7.5 Some people affected by Auckland lockdowns did not feel heard by decision-makers

Kāore ētahi tāngata i pāngia e ngā rāhui o Tāmaki Makaurau i te whakaaro kua rangona rātou e ngā kaiwhakatau

 
The Government engaged in a variety of ways with people and organisations affected by lockdowns. Even so, we heard that some people in Auckland did not feel heard in decision-making, especially on the extent of harmful impacts occurring in some parts of the region, or in some communities. This may partly be because they lacked an easy way to communicate those impacts so that decision-makers in Wellington could take them into account. People compared the Government's openness to feedback in 2020 with a more closed approach taken in 2021.

2.4.7.6 It is difficult to ascertain whether decision-makers received sufficient advice on the economic and social impacts of lockdowns in Waikato and Northland  

He uaua te mārama mēnā i rawaka ngā tohutohu i whiwhi ai ngā kaiwhakatau mō ngā pānga ōhanga, pāpori hoki o ngā rāhui ki Waikato me Te Tai Tokerau

 
As part of our assessment, we have closely considered the alert level decisions made in the second half of 2021 which affected Northland and Waikato. Unlike for Auckland, Cabinet did not always make these decisions. Instead, Ministers with Power to Act sometimes took urgent decisions to put lockdowns in place and, in relation to the Waikato, the Minister for COVID-19 Response sometimes made decisions about restriction levels himself.⁸⁹⁹

The decisions that were not made by Cabinet usually lacked comprehensive impact assessments. For some decisions, there does not appear to be a clear written record of what was taken into account.⁹⁰⁰ Ministers with Power to Act were making urgent decisions when cases were found outside Auckland, and we are told that advice was given orally in those circumstances. That being so, there is no record of the extent to which decision-makers were informed of economic or social impacts of their decisions.

For decisions relating to Waikato that were made by the Minister for COVID-19 Response (having consulted with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice and Minister of Health), briefings to him from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet provided some limited information on economic impacts and impacts on at-risk populations.⁹⁰¹ The economic impacts were a summary of national GDP reductions in various scenarios that had been provided in Cabinet papers, did not include Waikato separately from Auckland or Northland, and were subject to the caveat that the Treasury could not provide data on sub-regions (when only part of Waikato was under lockdown). Some additional information in relation to food grants in Waikato was also provided.

When decisions were made by Cabinet, Cabinet papers did not always separately address the situation in Northland or Waikato, as the need for up-to-the-minute information about these regions meant the Director-General of Health would provide oral briefings.⁹⁰²

Overall, the documents we have seen did not provide Ministers with tailored advice on the specific social and economic conditions in Northland or Waikato. Most impact assessments were national or regional in scope, lacking sub-regional granularity. Where advice was provided orally, there is no record of it for us to assess.

2.4.8 Most lockdown decisions reflected the advice given

I hāngai te nuinga o ngā whakatau rāhui ki ngā tohutohu i tukuna

 
In most cases, Cabinet's decisions on alert levels followed the recommendations of the Director-General of Health. We have identified two instances where this was not the case.

• On 13 September 2021, Cabinet elected to hold Auckland at Alert Level 4 until at least 21 September 2021, in circumstances where the Director-General's recommendation was that Auckland transition to Alert Level 3 on 17 September 2021. This was based on a recommendation by the Minister for COVID-19 Response that more time be allowed for testing.
• On 1 November 2021, the Director-General recommended that Auckland remain at Alert Level 3 stage 1 until at least 15 November 2021. The Minister for COVID-19 Response recommended that Cabinet should conduct a review on 15 November but suggested that Ministers with Power to Act be authorised to move to stage 2 on 8 November if supported by evidence. In the event, Cabinet agreed in principle to move Auckland to stage 2 on 9 November, subject to Cabinet confirmation on 8 November.

All key decisions on the transition to the COVID-19 Protection Framework appear to have followed advice or, where officials provided no clear recommendations, were closely based on advice.

2.4.9 Decision-makers took international experiences and practices into account appropriately

I tika te whai a ngā kaiwhakatau i ngā wheako me ngā tikanga o te ao whānui

 
In section 2.4.6.4, we outlined some of the advice decision-makers received on international experiences and evolving practices. They were provided with regular updates on international developments and the experiences in comparable jurisdictions. Ministers were aware, and noted, that international comparators should not be too influential and should be considered with care given New Zealand's unique circumstances. We consider key lockdown decisions took account of the experience and evolving practices of other countries to the extent that it was possible and appropriate to do so.

2.4.10 How did decision-makers balance different interests?

I pēhea ngā kaiwhakatau i taurite i ngā hiahia me ngā pānga rerekē?

 
It would be difficult to overstate the challenge faced by the Government in terms of the decisions it had to make over the course of the pandemic, and more particularly during the Auckland lockdown which resulted from the Delta outbreak. More than one interviewee observed that there were no 'good' choices that would meet the needs of all people and all interests. It was described to us as the 'luckless responsibility of Government and senior officials to try to find and navigate their way through bad choices and worse choices'.⁹⁰³

Rt. Hon. Chris Hipkins described the situation to us in stark terms:

A lot of days during COVID, it felt like you get out of bed in the morning and they were all bad options, so you were trying to choose the least bad of them. That was very much how it felt I think a lot of the time we were responding to COVID. It's not like you get out of bed and go, "Well, the angels are on this side," because some days there just weren't any of those options available.⁹⁰⁴

We also heard from Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern that she 'dreaded [and] loathed' having to make decisions that New Zealanders would go into lockdown.⁹⁰⁵

Faced with options ranging from ‘bad’ to ‘worse’, and knowing the difficulties faced by New Zealanders under lockdown restrictions, how did decision-makers approach their task? To assess this, our Terms of Reference require us to consider whether lockdown decisions struck a reasonable balance between COVID-19 public health goals and minimising social and economic disruption.

We consider that there were many factors needing to be balanced in making key decisions. At times, public health, social and economic interests were aligned and sometimes they were not. Our approach has been to look at the balancing ministers had to undertake in 2021, especially when it became clear that lockdowns were not going to eliminate the virus. As part of that analysis, we have also considered the options and tools available to ministers to minimise social and economic disruption caused by public health measures to reduce the spread and impact of the virus.

Decision-makers faced complex and exceedingly difficult choices. They had to weigh many more factors in addition to public health goals and social and economic disruption. Based on the evidence we have heard, that is exactly what they tried to do. But there are different ways of balancing relevant considerations when difficult decisions are being made. The first step is, of course, to identify the main factors that need to be weighed in the balance; we turn to this now.

2.4.10.1 What were the interests that decision-makers had to balance?

He aha ngā hiahia i tika kia tauritea e ngā kaiwhakatau?

 
A primary consideration for decision-makers was the immediate impact of the virus and of lockdown restrictions on health, economic activity, social wellbeing and education.

Health outcomes

Decision-makers were understandably very focused on the health outcomes of their decisions. Early modelling at the start of the pandemic showed that COVID-19 could cause significant loss of life if insufficient actions were taken. In addition, there was risk that high case numbers could overwhelm hospitals, and especially Intensive Care Units. Decision-makers in 2021⁹⁰⁶ understandably appear to have kept these potential outcomes in mind as a worst-case scenario that they needed to avoid.

But it had also become apparent that successive COVID-19 variants had different and unpredictable characteristics. As Rt. Hon. Chris Hipkins said, 'Each new variant, everyone's left wondering, is this going to be worse or better than the previous one?'⁹⁰⁷

By August 2021, decision-makers were aware of the Delta variant. They knew it was highly infectious (twice as transmissible as previous variants)⁹⁰⁸ and had seen high case numbers and fatalities in other countries where it was circulating.⁹⁰⁹ Modelling in June 2021 showed that an unmitigated Delta outbreak even in a highly vaccinated population could, in the most optimistic scenario, lead to 15,000 hospitalisations and 2,000 deaths.⁹¹⁰

New Zealand's vaccination programme was underway, and building momentum, but a large proportion of the population remained unvaccinated. The successful elimination of the virus meant that a meaningful level of immunity obtained through prior infections did not exist in New Zealand. Many people, therefore, were vulnerable to illness should the virus spread.

Even in mid-2021, the health system could not manage significant numbers of hospital or Intensive Care Unit admissions. We have seen advice to this effect in October 2021 as well.⁹¹¹ Phase One found that Intensive Care Unit capacity was not increased until early 2022.⁹¹² Front of mind for decision-makers, therefore, was the potential harm to individuals and to the health system if Delta circulated widely in the community.

Economic outcomes

Decision-makers also needed to consider the economic impacts of their decisions on people, businesses, the government and different regions. Potential economic impacts of restrictions on people and businesses included:

• restrictions on business activity When businesses were closed, or could not be accessed by customers, they would not earn their ordinary income. This affected their ability to pay their staff and to invest in business growth
• debt. If people or businesses lost income, they might need to borrow to meet their costs. Lost income could also mean people were unable to meet their existing debts, like mortgage repayments
• unemployment. If business activity is constrained, businesses might not be able to keep their staff. We were told that this was a key concern for decision-makers, and that they had been advised in 2020 that unemployment could rise as high as 13 percent.⁹¹³ They were focused on avoiding that outcome and did so, with unemployment peaking at 5.2 percent in September 2020, but not exceeding 3.3 percent during the 2021 lockdown⁹¹⁴
• business failure. Decision-makers were conscious that this was a potential outcome when businesses were prevented from trading or restricted from doing so fully. Data indicates that business closure rates in 2021 were higher than in 2020, but still comparable to 2019.⁹¹⁵

Decision-makers applying lockdown restrictions were also conscious of impacts on government inflation, such as:

• the cost of supports. Lockdown restrictions automatically made certain economic support payments available, and decision-makers needed to have confidence that those payments were appropriate and affordable
• tax revenue. As unemployment increases and spending decreases, and as GDP growth slows, the Government collects less revenue. This affects both its current spending and plans for future spending, given requirements for responsible fiscal management
• debt levels. The Government must pursue its policy objectives in accordance with principles of responsible fiscal management, including maintaining prudent levels of debt. As explained in section 2.4.6.2, the Treasury advised throughout the second half of 2021 that debt levels were prudent, and there was an expectation of returning to surplus within a short timeframe
• inflation. Increased spending on supports or other fiscal stimulus could raise inflation.

Decision-makers also needed to consider the economic connections between regions of New Zealand. Applying lockdown restrictions to one region would have flow-on effects in other regions, including:

• supply chain disruption. Applying a boundary to one or more regions and restricting movement in and out of the affected area meant supplies could not move through the country as usual. People in other regions reliant on goods produced in a region under restrictions could not receive those goods if their production was curtailed by lockdowns
• domestic tourism. With people unable to leave one region, visitor numbers in other regions would reduce. Similarly, the area under lockdown would not be able to receive visitors from other areas.

With all the above in mind, we heard that an important part of the 'least regrets' approach taken by the Government was to ensure cashflow and confidence for businesses.⁹¹⁶ Economic supports were put in place to try to mitigate impacts and encourage compliance with restrictions.

Social outcomes

Decision-makers needed to consider a wide range of potentially negative social outcomes that could arise from applying lockdown restrictions. Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern explained their potential breadth:

 ... as a government, we have to worry about our rough sleepers. We have to worry about families in domestic violence situations, children who rely on school to access food, stability and protection. We have to worry about the job losses, small businesses who won't be able to operate, access to essential services ... the elderly, the isolated. We had to worry about all of those groups... That awareness never went away. The entire time, we thought about the impacts on those groups, the cumulative impact of lockdowns, and people's mental health and wellbeing, as well as the economic impacts.⁹¹⁷

As we set out in section 2.4.6.3, Cabinet papers contained information on a range of impacts of lockdowns on at-risk populations.

For the most part, decision-makers did not directly address social impacts when taking decisions on alert levels. Instead, they decided to put in place supports to minimise those impacts (discussed below). However, in making changes to Alert Level 3 conditions in early October 2021, decision-makers were recognising the burdens of lockdown faced by Aucklanders, and showed their intention to reduce those burdens by allowing greater social connection. The social impacts they observed influenced this decision.

Educational outcomes

Decision-makers were being told of the immediate negative impacts of children being away from schools for a prolonged period. Managing these impacts required care, considering both the public health risk and parents' (and staff) perception of the risk of virus transmission.

As the Auckland lockdown continued, decision-makers sought to mitigate impacts on educational outcomes by allowing on-site learning in Alert Level 3. In late October 2021, senior high school students returned to face-to-face learning in Auckland. In early November, Cabinet decided to allow face-to-face learning for all remaining students from 17 November 2021, which was shortly prior to the transition to the COVID-19 Protection Framework.

Future costs and impacts

Decision-makers also needed to consider and weigh the longer-term consequences of their decisions.

Alert level restrictions would reduce transmission of the virus and so avoid disruption to New Zealand's health system. Restrictions would lower infection rates and avoid deaths and the resulting long-term impacts on families, as well as reducing the incidence of 'Long COVID'.

As discussed above, the cost of economic supports such as the Wage Subsidy Scheme and other fiscal measures would raise government debt over the longer term and stimulate inflation. Bearing the burden of debt, and efforts to reduce debt, will impact future generations. Inflation has stronger impacts over time on people with fixed incomes.

Unemployment and loss of income could have longer-term impacts on individual and family wellbeing, through difficulties in finding jobs, enduring poor mental health and lack of resources to invest in future opportunities. Increased stress on families could raise the risk of family violence.

Lost or less-effective schooling could have longer- term consequences for future education achievement. Affected young people may be less successful in their careers as a result.

We acknowledge the uncertainty facing decision-makers in relation to long-term outcomes. Alert level restrictions were a new mechanism and, while projections and predictions could be made, exactly how the impacts would play out over a longer period was not known. We are still learning about impacts today (as described in section 2.4.12 below).

The counter-factual: what would have happened without lockdowns?

While understanding the potential impacts of lockdown restrictions, decision-makers also had to weigh them against the potential outcomes of alternative approaches.

A key consideration for decision-makers was the availability of other tools to manage the COVID-19 response. We were told that lockdowns needed to be used because, until the population was sufficiently vaccinated, there were no other tools that would provide an adequate level of protection from the virus. Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern explained:

Lockdowns and that set of public health tools that sat around that were in the absence of any other form of protection for New Zealanders, in the absence of an individual armour. If you don't have vaccines, how do you protect people from COVID-19? And so we had a suite of protections that existed that were all captured by an alert level framework until we had a vaccine that would enable us to transition away from what were extraordinary measures, that meant the loss of people's individual liberties.⁹¹⁸

It is impossible to know for certain how an uncontrolled Delta outbreak would have affected New Zealand, because that outcome was avoided. However, decision-makers were being told about significant increases in case numbers in other countries with less stringent restrictions (see section 2.4.6.4).

Decision-makers knew that, without alert level restrictions, case numbers, hospitalisations and deaths would have increased. And without regional boundary or travel restrictions, they would have occurred throughout the country. Based on international experiences, the following outcomes were also possible if no lockdown restrictions were put in place.

• Businesses, education facilities and government services would be disrupted by staff absences as more people became unwell.
• A large proportion of the population would stay home to avoid the virus. This would have had flow-on effects for the economy as businesses lost custom and laid off staff.
• There would have been social tension between parts of the community who wanted to stay home, and those who were more comfortable with fewer protections.
• Some parents would keep children home from school. Without distance-learning formally in place, there would have been detrimental impacts on children who were not receiving any education.
• The prevalence of the virus in the community would force elderly and immunocompromised people into isolation.
• The health system, which was 'not ready to handle more cases or more hospitalisations on a sustainable basis',⁹¹⁹ would struggle to meet the needs of unwell individuals. If the health system was not coping, by necessity the country may have reverted to lockdown restrictions anyway.

Similar scenarios may have occurred if the lockdown ended too soon, while vaccination rates were still low.

We have noticed that people sometimes mix the experiences and impacts of the pandemic with the experiences and impacts of the Government's response. However, decision-makers were appropriately aware that New Zealand would still have faced difficult economic and social outcomes if the 2021 lockdown had not occurred, or if it had been of a shorter duration. Some outcomes would have been worse.

Costs and benefits for the many against those for the few

Like Phase One, we heard very clearly from our engagements and from submissions that the impacts of lockdown restrictions were more harmful to some than others. Many people, while perhaps not enjoying living under restrictions, were not significantly harmed by them and even benefitted from having flexible working arrangements, being able to enjoy more family time and practise self-care.

Others, however, had a negative experience. Some people suffered from isolation and mental health issues; some lost their jobs or businesses; others were separated from loved ones in difficult circumstances, such as a medical crisis or when a family member died. Different impacts were felt in different regions, as well as in different communities.

Even outside the lockdown areas, impacts were felt differently. Many people in New Zealand were able to live under Alert Level 2 with very little impact on their day-to-day lives. Some businesses, however, were dependent on supplies or customers from the Auckland region that were heavily restricted or unavailable, causing significant harm. The Northland region, even when under Alert Level 2, was in many ways cut off from the rest of the country because of its boundary with Auckland.

A further complexity was that lockdown decisions had the potential to cause more economic, social and educational harm to the people that the health measures were aiming to prioritise and protect. These included Māori, Pasifika, lower-income communities, disabled people and the elderly.⁹²⁰

Similarly, we found that young people suffered disproportionately from lockdown restrictions, while less likely to suffer serious illness from COVID-19.⁹²¹

When decision-makers described having to choose between 'bad' and 'worse' decisions, we believe these are some of the issues they had in mind. They knew that making decisions which would be beneficial to a large proportion of the population from a health perspective would be very harmful to people in other ways. This is a difficult situation to balance and reflects an underlying tension that is fundamental to alert level restrictions.

Social licence for lockdown measures

Decision-makers were conscious that ‘the alert level system only worked because of voluntary compliance… it only worked because there was goodwill towards it and people were willing to follow the rules’.⁹²² This is because, from a practical perspective, the restrictions could not be effectively enforced against all members of the population. Decision-makers understood that New Zealanders' compliance with alert level restrictions was what made the elimination strategy possible.

Rt. Hon. Chris Hipkins explained the challenges involved in following health advice but doing so in a way that would preserve as much public goodwill as possible. He emphasised that '...preserving public goodwill was a huge consideration every single day through the pandemic'.⁹²³

This became more challenging as the Auckland lockdown went on. Decision-makers told us that public goodwill was becoming strained as people tired of the restrictions. They described how they were grappling with the need to keep people 'on board'.⁹²⁴ Similarly, Police described to us how, when public commentary started to indicate that complete elimination of COVID-19 in New Zealand was unlikely, attitudes to lockdowns changed.⁹²⁵

The evidence shows that diminishing compliance with alert level restrictions was a significant (if not the primary) driver of the outbreak through October and November 2021.

Research commissioned by the Ministry of Health in November 2023⁹²⁶ highlights that people are less likely to take protective measures when interventions do not appear to be effective, and/or when interventions are inconsistent or illogical. We consider the experience in Auckland as the lockdown progressed is consistent with this.

• When interventions appeared ineffective in controlling the outbreak, people broke the rules, and so the outbreak continued to spread.
• When vaccination rates rose and cases were not prevalent in the wider community, but restrictions did not change, people may have felt that the interventions no longer made sense. This was likely compounded by confusion about the three stages of Alert Level 3.

Decision-makers told us they learned the importance of giving people an end date, or some indication of 'light at the end of the tunnel' so that people knew what they were working towards: '... giving people certainty around "this is when you'll start to feel life [is] more normal", that helped with compliance'.⁹²⁷

This reasoning helped to underpin the 90 percent vaccination target, which gave people a concrete indication as to when restrictions would lift. Even though there was no certain date, people were given a clear action plan to follow to bring about the end of lockdown restrictions.

2.4.10.2 What approach was taken to balancing interests when lockdown decisions were made?

He aha te huarahi i whāia hei taurite i ngā hiahia i te wā i mahia ai ngā whakatau rāhui?

 
Having given an overview of some of the wide range of matters decision-makers needed to consider and balance when making lockdown key decisions, we now assess the approach that was taken to that balancing exercise.

The best economic and social response is a strong health response

The consistent message we have received from decision-makers is that preventing death and illness by way of a strong public health response was also protective of the economy and of society. They therefore did not consider they were 'trading off' public health against economic and social outcomes.

Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern explained:

I think the important point to make really early on as well is that there seems to be an assumption that we chose public health, and therefore wore the cost, the economic costs or the social cost or the cohesion cost, when actually our very strong view, and we said it openly at the time, was having analysed and observed what was happening internationally... that to choose to lean into an approach that focused on the preservation of life and to avoid preventable deaths, that actually was backed up by analysis, the best economic approach we could take and the best social approach we could take... In our view, we were choosing to lean into all three – the lowest economic cost, the lowest health, loss of life.⁹²⁸

Similarly, Rt. Hon. Chris Hipkins said that he 'always resisted the notion that we were trading off health versus the economy and social factors, because I always saw those things as intricately linked. I think you'll find the collective view of those involved in decision-making was that they were intricately linked.'⁹²⁹

Hon. Grant Robertson explained that, from the perspective of the economy, this approach was:

 ... based on the idea that the loss of life from a pandemic spreading in an unrestricted manner would severely deplete the workforce and restrain economic activity. And there was evidence for that from other countries who were seeing significant reductions in economic activity as the pandemic spread. If we look at the UK for example, they saw GDP decline by 9.7% in 2020. And trends show that economic activity picked up with the opening up of the economy, there would be a rise in COVID cases. There'd be further lockdowns and economic activity would fall again. So we were observing internationally that that was happening. So that was what it was based on. I think our stance was supported by the external assessments of the New Zealand economy.⁹³⁰

This approach was described to us as an intrinsic part of the elimination strategy. Public health measures that reduced the spread of COVID-19, such as closing the international border and restrictions on movement through lockdowns, protected both lives and livelihoods, compared to the alternative. The alternative was COVID-19 spreading unconstrained through the country, causing illness, hospitalisations and deaths, curtailing social activities, impacting the delivery of public services, and causing severe disruption to the economy. It is this alternative that former ministers referred to constantly in their interviews with the Inquiry.

Effectively eliminating COVID-19 from New Zealand could justify some of the most severe restrictions of any comparable jurisdiction on movement at the international border, and inside the country during outbreaks. This allowed residents to enjoy long periods of normality with very few restrictions on social and economic activities.

This approach explains the heavy emphasis on public health considerations that we saw in documents. In almost all cases, decision-makers followed the recommendations of the Director-General of Health on alert level decisions.

Decision-makers weighed the disruptions and impacts on individuals and communities, and on businesses and the economy, and considered them justified in pursuit of elimination because elimination had better social and economic outcomes than other strategies, if it could be achieved.

Decisions were made to mitigate the adverse impacts of lockdowns

Decision-makers recognised that, if their choice of a strong public health response to achieve the best social and economic outcomes worked in the aggregate, this would still have uneven impacts on individuals and population groups. As a result, they chose ways to mitigate and so balance the adverse impact of lockdown restrictions on economic and social outcomes.

This was explained to us by Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern:

• You name a sector of society we should have been worried about during COVID and there will have been some work done. We were very aware that this was not costless...
•  ... On the financial side of things, wage subsidy, income relief payment, leave support scheme, rent arrears assistance, the doubling of the winter energy payment, reactivation plan, all of those based around our attempts to mitigate the deep concern we had of the economic impacts of these public health measures. They were significant, the plans we put in place. And so there was deep awareness and there were significant attempts to try and mitigate.⁹³¹

Cabinet regularly reviewed social support funding. Within the first two weeks of the lockdown, Cabinet agreed to reprioritise funding to improve access to food, essential items and essential services for people in need.⁹³² On 9 September 2021, the COVID-19 Ministerial Group noted anticipated increased demand for food and other wellbeing items, and agreed to funding adjustments and increases to meet this need.⁹³³ On 6 October 2021, the Cabinet Business Committee agreed to temporarily increase income limits applying to hardship assistance.⁹³⁴ On 11 October 2021, Cabinet agreed to allocate further funding to meet anticipated demand for food and other essential wellbeing items.⁹³⁵

The former Minister of Finance, Hon. Grant Robertson described the approach taken to economic support for businesses as being '...least regrets... we wanted to ensure cash flow and confidence. And in order to do that we had a fund set up as we did'.⁹³⁶ This resulted in some generous support packages being tied to alert level restrictions. In our engagements, we have heard from businesses that these support packages were well-managed, particularly by the Ministry of Social Development, and very helpful.

Of course, providing economic support created a cost for the Government. As outlined above, the advice to decision-makers by the Treasury throughout the lockdown period was that the economic supports were appropriate, and government debt levels were prudent (see section 2.4.6.2).

While acknowledging the efforts of the Government to mitigate the detrimental impacts of lockdown restrictions, we note that we have also heard from some groups who did not consider they were adequately supported. We have heard evidence of significant community efforts to support people through the restriction periods, undertaken with limited resources and little or no government assistance. We have heard about the efforts of Auckland Council and associated bodies, who stepped in to fill gaps in the Government response.

2.4.10.3 What did decision-makers consider when transitioning away from elimination?

He aha ngā mea i whāia e ngā kaiwhakatau i te hekenga atu i te rautaki aukati-katoa?

 
At least initially in August 2021, Alert Level 4 restrictions significantly limited the Delta outbreak in Auckland, preventing infections, illness and hospitalisations. The boundary around Auckland protected the rest of the country from the Delta virus and allowed most of the country to live under low-level restrictions for an extended period. Lockdowns bought New Zealand time to increase vaccination rates and wait out the peak of the Delta outbreak.

However, by early October 2021 decision-makers were becoming aware that lockdown restrictions and associated public health measures would not eliminate the Delta outbreak in the near term.⁹³⁷ This was for several reasons, including challenges arising from Delta's higher transmissibility and shorter incubation rate, combined with diminishing willingness to comply with lockdown restrictions.

As the lockdown went on and the virus was not eliminated, it could not be assumed that lockdown restrictions would still lead to the best economic and social outcomes. The balance was shifting and the costs of lockdown restrictions may have begun to outweigh the benefits. In early October, the Ministry of Social Development advised its Minister that 'it may be close to the point where the social costs outweigh the public health benefits'.⁹³⁸

Hon. Ayesha Verrall acknowledged this, saying that 'there was a short period of time – October and November 2021 – where restrictions achieved public health benefits but these did not emphatically outweigh the costs as they had earlier in the pandemic'.⁹³⁹ That being so, and in the presence of high rates of vaccination, the justifications for limitations on people's rights were beginning to shift. Rt. Hon. Chris Hipkins said in evidence to the Waitangi Tribunal that:

The public health justification for continuing hard lockdowns in the face of very high vaccination rates was withering away (which is to say they were becoming unjustifiable and so unsustainable from a legal point of view and from the perspective of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act).⁹⁴⁰

By early November 2021, the Director-General's advice to Cabinet was that the risk of an increase in case numbers by shifting to stage 2 of Alert Level 3 was likely outweighed by the benefits of easing restrictions to the wellbeing of Aucklanders.

Over this period, the Government faced the challenge of deciding when and how to transition to a new approach. Decision-makers identified this as one of the most challenging aspects of the pandemic response. Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern explained some of the dynamics:

 … we were very, very aware of the fact that some people had gone out and done the thing that we'd asked in order for us to transition into a new strategy. But because not enough people had done it yet, we weren't able to move at the pace we wanted. Now those individuals had a very valid point that they were making but so too was the point that unless we had a large enough cohort, we might be affecting the immune compromised. We might be affecting those who might experience vaccine hesitancy and needed a bit more time. So there were very valid arguments being made on all sides, and I heard all of them. I talked very openly about this being one of the most difficult periods because we understood the fatigue. We were aware of the tension around social cohesion, and many of our responses were built around that.⁹⁴¹

When considering a transition, decision-makers were conscious of the health risks associated with any loosening of restrictions. Rt. Hon. Chris Hipkins observed that:

 … the nature of the public health response changes when you move from elimination to suppression, if you like. But a weak public health response, as you move from elimination to suppression, is likely to be even more economically costly than a strong one, because one of the big issues that we had was workforce availability, and COVID ripping through the community really quickly once elimination was no longer achievable would've been a disastrous economic response.⁹⁴²

Up until the start of December 2021, modelling provided to decision-makers showed that case numbers and hospitalisations were aligned to the most pessimistic forecasts, and in some cases were exceeding them. This would not have given decision-makers confidence that lifting restrictions would be optimal from a public health perspective. Though the trajectory improved shortly after, it was reasonable for decision-makers at the time to be cautious.

We understand decision-makers were also highly conscious of the disparate vaccination rates in Māori and Pacific communities. Given the protection the vaccine offered against serious illness, lower vaccination rates in those communities meant they would face higher risk when restrictions lifted. This was an outcome decision-makers were concerned to avoid as far as possible.

Additionally, decision-makers considered that communicating to the public too soon that the virus was not going to be eliminated had the following risks.⁹⁴³

• People might turn on the groups who they saw as responsible for that, which included some disenfranchised and vulnerable communities.
• People might not see any point to following restrictions, which could result in significantly increased transmission.

Views in the community as to when a transition should occur were split and often polarised. While many considered that New Zealand should start 'living with the virus', others were concerned at the health risk associated with lifting restrictions too soon. Decision-makers wanted to ensure, as far as possible, that the public understood and supported any transition. They considered there was a risk that, if health impacts were not sufficiently mitigated, people may not have seen it as safe to go out and fully engage in the economy and community – there may have been hesitancy around returning to work, educational facilities or social events, which would have had other negative impacts.⁹⁴⁴

As mentioned in section 2.4.4.8, we also saw that a key consideration for decision-makers was the belief that there was a risk of confusion or complexity arising from shifting Auckland to Alert Level 3 stage 3 in November 2021, prior to transition to the new Framework. Yet our engagement with Auckland businesses suggested that 'every day counted', and moving to stage 3 would have been far preferable to waiting an additional two or three weeks for the new Framework.

Decision-makers therefore had to weigh a wide range of differing interests and impacts when considering the timing for transition, which ultimately occurred in early December 2021. However, we consider any analysis of the transition must also take into account two other factors relevant to the timing: the development of the COVID-19 Protection Framework and the adoption of the 90 percent vaccination target.

Development of the COVID-19 Protection Framework and the 90 percent vaccination target

As explained in section 2.4.4.5, the Government elected to transition away from the elimination strategy and end the Auckland lockdown by way of entry into the COVID-19 Protection Framework. Development of the Framework began after a decision of a Cabinet Committee on 15 September 2021, around one month after the beginning of the Auckland lockdown. Cabinet agreed overall goals of a new framework on 4 October 2021. On 18 October 2021, Cabinet:

• agreed to the transition and adopted a 90 percent vaccination target, noting that officials would continue to finalise detailed settings of the framework, and
• invited the Minister for COVID-19 Response to issue drafting instructions to amend the COVID-19 Public Health Response Act to give effect to COVID-19 Vaccination Certificates (see Chapter 2.2).

The 90 percent target appears to have arisen initially as an aspiration. The Government had been clear in public messaging that New Zealand needed to achieve high levels of vaccination, and people wanted clarity on what that meant. The Director-General of Health identified 90 percent publicly in a press conference in September 2021, and this was adopted by the media and across communities. The target acted as a rallying point, helping to motivate and drive up vaccination rates. It also gave Aucklanders a concrete measure for when the lockdown would end.

Evidence presented to decision-makers over a lengthy period indicated that a high rate of vaccination within the population was preferable, and that public health outcomes, particularly in terms of deaths and hospitalisations from the virus, would be improved as vaccination rates increased. Achieving a very high vaccination rate was a key focus for decision-makers when determining when to transition to the new Framework. However, experts have also told us that, given the nature of the virus as a respiratory infection, no level of vaccination would ever entirely prevent transmission or create herd immunity. That being so, there was no 'magic number' for an ideal vaccination rate and the 90 percent target has been described to us as 'slightly arbitrary'⁹⁴⁵ Phase One of this Inquiry found that the 90 percent target was not epidemiologically necessary,⁹⁴⁶ pointing to the outcomes of the 70 percent target in Australia by way of comparison.⁹⁴⁷

As development of the COVID-19 Protection Framework continued, its progress can be seen in the following.

• On 26 October 2021, Cabinet was advised that the legislation needed to implement COVID-19 Vaccination Certificates might be able to be enacted by the end of November 2021⁹⁴⁸
• On 15 November 2021, the Minister for COVID-19 Response advised Cabinet that COVID-19 Vaccination Certificates would be ready to use at the start of December, and that 'work on running a CVC verification pilot is underway, with a view to test with select businesses in Auckland, when feasible'.⁹⁴⁹
• Agencies developed sector guidance and prepared it for publication in the week beginning 22 November 2021.²⁵⁰
• The domestic My COVID Pass having been available from 15 November 2021, a pilot of the verifier app for COVID-19 Vaccination Certificates was ready from 22 November 2021, and ready for general release on 1 December 2021.⁹⁵¹
• The amendment legislation to give effect to COVID-19 Vaccination Certificates was introduced on 23 November 2021 and received Royal Assent on 25 November 2021.
• A draft Order to give effect to the COVID-19 Protection Framework was provided to the Minister for COVID-19 Response on 30 November 2021.⁹⁵²

Former ministers advise that the timing of the development of the COVID-19 Protection Framework did not have any bearing on the timing of the transition.⁹⁵³ We agree that their focus was on vaccination rates and the myriad of other considerations we have outlined above (see section 2.4.10.1).

However, as can be seen from the above, irrespective of what vaccination target was applied or what view was taken of the timing for transition, the late development of the COVID-19 Protection Framework meant it could not have been put in place prior to late November.

The use of urgency to pass the relevant legislation suggests that it was not ready for introduction any sooner.⁹⁵⁴ Assuming an Order could have been signed the day after the legislation received Royal Assent, and bearing in mind the requirement to give 48 hours' notice,⁹⁵⁵ the earliest the COVID-19 Protection Framework could have been in place appears to have been 28 November 2021. This is consistent with the advice that Cabinet was given in October 2021, outlined above.

Cabinet rescinded the 90 percent vaccination target on 22 November 2021 – the day before legislation was introduced to give effect to COVID-19 Vaccination Certificates. As we have explained (see section 2.4.4.8), we have been advised that Ministers agreed to do so because they were confident the target would be met over the coming weeks, and to allow the new Framework to be put in place before the Christmas holidays. We also observe that this decision aligned with the earliest the Government was ready to introduce legislation to implement the new Framework.

We therefore consider that development of the Framework, and especially the legislative and technological requirements for COVID-19 Vaccination Certificates, cannot be excluded as an influencing factor in relation to the timing of the transition and so the duration of the Auckland lockdown. This is relevant to our comments on the importance of strategy review below.

2.4.11 Our assessment of the balancing of interests when key decisions were made

Tā mātou aromatawai i te taurite o ngā hiahia i te wā i mahia ai ngā whakatau matua

 
We set out here our reasons for finding that decision-makers' approach to balancing different factors in their decisions on lockdowns was reasonable. We also set out ways in which we consider balancing could have been improved.

2.4.11.1 A strong health response can be the best for the economy and for social outcomes

Nā tētahi urupare hauora kaha ka puta ngā hua pai mō te ōhanga me te pāpori 

 
When elimination of a harmful virus is possible, and in the absence of better protective measures like a vaccine, strict lockdowns (short and sharp) can lead to better health and social outcomes in a pandemic, because eliminating the virus allows society to spend more time living without it. This is fundamental to an elimination strategy.

New Zealand's experience in 2020 using lockdowns (combined with border restrictions) to eliminate the virus demonstrated this. Elimination allowed New Zealanders to live normally for an extended period, while populations around the world continued to face restrictions and/or negative health outcomes.

However, important caveats should apply to the proposition that a strong health response can be best for economic and social outcomes. Decision-makers need to be (and were) mindful of the uneven distribution of both the benefits and the impacts across society, as well as the cumulative impacts of multiple lockdowns. In our view, they should consider these issues not only in the context of mitigation of the impacts of public health measures, but also in deciding, in a structured way, whether to adopt such measures.

We also observe that decision-makers have choices around the margins of a strong public health response that can reduce the more harmful impacts. For example, they can decide on specific details of lockdown restrictions and their duration or on the combination and timing of the use of different public health tools.

The Alert Level System was a blunt, highly prescriptive public health measure that, by necessity, applied across a wide range of different contexts. At Alert Levels 3 and 4, there was little room for individuals or businesses to make their own assessment of risk and act accordingly (as there is in the health and safety context, for example). Some people told us that they had enough information in 2021 to be able to manage their businesses safely, but that this was not achievable within the Alert Level System. In the future, increased flexibility and devolving responsibility for some measures may help to better balance strong health outcomes and economic and social impacts.

Further, whether the strong health response continues to lead to the best social and economic outcomes must be kept under close review. Having regular, systematic and more detailed estimates of the expected impacts, would better inform key decisions. This would more readily allow decision-makers to judge the extent to which the wider social and economic benefits of a strong health response continue to exist.

The duration and cumulative impacts of lockdown restrictions are also key considerations for deciding whether a strong health response remains the best response overall. Decision-makers needed to continually assess whether the outcomes from 2020 would be repeated in 2021. Relevant factors to consider included:

• ongoing impacts from prior lockdowns. In 2020, the lockdown was a first for everyone. In 2021, Auckland had already spent 81 days in a form of lockdown since March 2020 (more than the national 49 days). While Aucklanders were perhaps more accustomed to and prepared for lockdowns in a practical sense, many businesses and individuals had run down their financial reserves, patience was wearing thin and compliance would likely wither with further lockdowns
• the different duration of restrictions. In 2020, New Zealand was at Alert Level 4 for 34 days, then Alert Level 3 for 16 days, before returning to Alert Level 2. This was a total of 50 days. In 2021, Auckland was at Alert Level 4 for 35 days, and Alert Level 3 for 72 days – a total of 107 days. Day 50 of the 2021 lockdown was 6 October 2021

• the different nature of restrictions. In 2021, Alert Level 3 was adjusted to allow some additional freedoms. Also, in 2021, the lockdown applied primarily to one region (Auckland) rather than nationally, which may have suggested a focus on regional outcomes in addition to national ones was more important than in 2020
• the different nature of the virus. Delta's high transmissibility and short incubation period reduced the effectiveness of lockdown restrictions and other existing measures such as contact tracing
• vaccination rates. The increasing numbers of vaccinated people meant that circulation of the virus would be less harmful in late 2021 than would have been the case in 2020. We also now know that there was waning immunity from the COVID-19 vaccines, meaning that in some cases the most vulnerable people who were vaccinated first had less protection by the time the lockdown was ending⁹⁵⁶
• the different context in which the lockdown ended. In 2020, the country moved into Alert Level 2 and very few restrictions thereafter. In 2021, Auckland moved into 'Red' in the COVID-19 Protection Framework, which was more restrictive than Alert Level 2, meaning there was not the immediate freedom that was experienced after the 2020 lockdown.

Eliminating the virus from New Zealand had significant advantages over other strategies. However, the factors set out above demonstrate that it would be overly simplistic to proceed on the basis that taking the strongest public health approach will always achieve the best social and economic outcomes, or that the same approach will achieve the same outcomes over the course of a future pandemic, without considering a wide range of other factors.

2.4.11.2 When circumstances changed

I te huringa o ngā āhuatanga

 
By early October 2021 it was becoming apparent to officials and decision-makers that the Auckland outbreak was not going to be eliminated in the near future. Social licence, too, was diminishing. We consider that, at this point, decision-makers should have reassessed the belief that continuing with the strongest public health response would also achieve the best economic and social outcomes. This is because those outcomes were dependent on lockdowns being 'short and sharp', and on a return to normal (or near-normal) activity with the virus eliminated from the community, but this was no longer a likely outcome.

Also significant are the changing circumstances associated with increasing vaccination rates in October and November 2021, reducing the risk associated with community transmission. The Auckland region appears to have surpassed 70 percent vaccination of the eligible population (which was the target applied in Australia) by around 19 October 2021, though some communities had substantially lower rates.⁹⁵⁷ While other factors set out above are also relevant, this suggests that decision-makers could potentially have lowered restrictions in Auckland from that point, or soon thereafter – although we acknowledge that we are making this observation with the benefit of hindsight and data from Australia.⁹⁵⁸ We also note that the COVID-19 Protection Framework was not ready for operation at that time.

Phase One found that, as the lockdown went on, difficulty arose because decision-makers were not prepared for a scenario in which lockdown restrictions did not successfully eliminate the virus.⁹⁵⁹ We consider decision-makers would have benefited from a clearer and more structured approach to balancing interests that were becoming less aligned.

In our view, a more structured approach to strategy review (as recommended by Phase One) could have identified the change in circumstances and allowed for consideration of a different strategy sooner.

We also think it significant that, in mid-November 2021, decision-makers chose to end the lockdown by transition to the COVID-19 Protection Framework rather than by reducing restrictions within the Alert Level system beyond stage 2 of Alert Level 3. On 8 November 2021, the Minister for COVID-19 Response flagged to Cabinet that if Auckland proceeded to Alert Level 3 stage 3 prior to the transition to the new Framework, and then went into 'Red', restrictions would ease for vaccinated people but would tighten for unvaccinated people.⁹⁶⁰

On 15 November 2021, the Minister advised Cabinet that, while the original intention was to step down all stages of Alert Level 3 towards the Framework, this risked confusion and 'net-negative outcomes' for some businesses.⁹⁶¹ In its minute, Cabinet noted that 'decisions around moving to Auckland to Alert Level 3.3 must strike a balance between increased freedoms and the potential confusion of a new set of rules for a very short period of time together with the risk of compounding change'.⁹⁶² This does not fit neatly into the nine factors intended to guide Cabinet's alert level decisions (see Appendix 2).

The documentation suggests that Ministers considered there would be confusion or other negative outcomes associated with a move to stage 3 prior to transition, and that this influenced their decisions to hold at stage 2 prior to the transition to the new Framework. While acknowledging the short duration of time between 15 November and transition, this limited decision-makers' options as the Framework was not ready for transition until the end of November 2021. The late development of the Framework, and its relationship with the duration of the Auckland lockdown, again emphasises the importance of planning and strategy.

In making these observations, we emphasise that, over the period October to November 2021, it was possible that the impacts of the lockdown restrictions (in aggregate, even if not for some individuals) were not as harmful as an outbreak of the virus would have been. We note especially the potential harm that could have occurred in communities with vaccination rates far below those of the general population, which we know was a concern for decision-makers. If it was the case that lockdown restrictions caused less disruption than an outbreak would have, then those restrictions may still have been the way to achieve the best overall economic and social outcomes even if elimination was not achieved. Since this outcome did not occur, we cannot say definitively either way. However, we have not seen clear evidence of decision-makers interrogating their strategy or approach in a way that we think was necessary.

2.4.12 Our assessment of unforeseen and potentially long-term consequences of key decisions

Tā mātou aromatawai i ngā pānga kāore i matapaetia, tae atu ki ngā pānga roa o ngā whakatau matua

 
It is inherently difficult for decision-makers to foresee all, or even the most significant and enduring consequences of lockdowns. New Zealand and the world had little modern experience of lockdowns, so reliable data and models to predict impacts in such novel circumstances were not always available.

For example, while the Treasury did model the expected macroeconomic effects of the pandemic, lockdowns and programmes to support businesses in 2021 (section 2.4.6.2), by 2025 it had found that 'the fiscal impact of the COVID-19 response was much larger than expected.'⁹⁶³ Other countries similarly found macroeconomic forecasting less reliable during the pandemic.

It is almost impossible to estimate the effect of lags in 'getting back to normal'. We have found that the rebound in economic activity after the 2021 lockdowns was weaker than after the 2020 lockdowns. The two situations were quite different. The first bounce back reflected the impact of expenditure that had simply been deferred from the lockdown, whereas muted spending and capital investment from 2022 likely reflected considerable uncertainty about future economic conditions. That said, our research shows that the adverse impact of lockdowns on Auckland businesses in terms of survival and sales revenue in subsequent years has been less than previously thought.⁹⁶⁴

Decision-makers were aware of and concerned about the loss to children's schooling due to lockdowns (see section 2.4.6.3).⁹⁶⁵ Overall, New Zealand spent fewer days in lockdown involving school closures than many other countries. It will still be some years before the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on young people's education become fully apparent, but our research has enabled us to make some observations.⁹⁶⁶

School attendance in New Zealand has taken almost four years since the end of lockdowns to get back to pre-COVID-19 levels.⁹⁶⁷ Even so, our research indicates that, while school closures did have effects on learning, they were comparatively modest by international standards. We cannot fully estimate the flow-on effects of any lower achievement at school on longer-term educational achievement and labour-market outcomes, such as employment and earnings.

The research literature suggests that the immediate effects of lockdowns can have longer-term adverse impacts through other channels. These include, for example, effects on mental health, domestic violence, increasing scepticism about government programmes and communications, loss of access to primary and secondary healthcare, and vaccine hesitancy. Decision-makers were aware of the immediate effects of lockdowns on these and took them into account in their decisions. The longer-term consequences we describe would have been less clear to them.

We acknowledge, though, that in estimating the longer-term impacts of lockdowns, the effects of the pandemic itself should be considered, as well as the impacts of the pandemic in the absence of government interventions.

We return to these issues and the lessons we have been able to learn, with the benefit of hindsight, in Part 3.

2.4.13 Summary assessments: lockdown decisions

Ngā whakarāpopototanga aromatawai: ngā whakatau rāhui

 
When making key lockdown decisions, decision-makers were sufficiently informed but would have benefited from additional data and information as to the potential impacts of the choices before them. Their decisions closely followed the public health advice that was given to them, and they took into account the experiences of other comparable countries in an appropriate way.

The approach taken by decision-makers to balancing interests was reasonable and evidence-based. The key issues we have identified are that:

• a significant change in circumstances occurred in October 2021 when decision-makers realised that elimination was no longer achievable, even as vaccination rates were increasing – and they did not account for this clearly in the strategy and subsequent alert level decisions
• if decision-makers had taken this into account as we suggest, we consider (with the benefit of hindsight) that it was open to them to reach the view sooner that it was safe to lower some restrictions. However, regardless, the late development of the COVID-19 Protection Framework would have prevented any transition prior to the end of November.

We cannot exclude these as contributing factors to the duration of the Auckland lockdown.

It may be that outcomes would have been the same or not significantly different overall if decision-makers had reassessed their strategy, changed their decision-making process, or been provided additional data in the way we have suggested. Looking back from 2026, it is difficult to attribute population-level outcomes to a four- to six-week period in October/November 2021 when restrictions in Auckland might have been lower. However, we acknowledge the significantly different outcomes that could have occurred for some people and businesses if restrictions had lifted sooner.

We have seen mixed evidence on unexpected consequences of lockdown decisions. Macroeconomic impacts now appear worse than forecast at the time, but enduring impacts on business survival and revenue in Auckland are lower than first thought. Emerging evidence suggests that we avoided the more severe impacts on educational achievement that have been seen in other countries. Any longer-term impacts on individual earnings, employment, health and wellbeing will take time to appear and would not have been well understood at the time lockdown decisions were taken.

It must be borne in mind that all strategies to manage a public health crisis are interconnected. Lockdowns were only one component in a toolbox of complementary measures available to decision-makers to respond to the pandemic effectively while minimising resulting social and economic costs. For example, if the desired vaccination rate could have been achieved earlier, lockdowns could have been lifted earlier. That being so, the overall situation needs to be reviewed holistically on a regular basis to ensure that each component is contributing in a meaningful way to the overall objective of the policies being pursued.

Having considered all the evidence that has been put before us, we are left in no doubt that former ministers and their officials made strenuous efforts to make the right decisions as the pandemic relentlessly progressed. In our view, though, in October and November 2021 the Government was facing an extremely difficult situation. This, in turn, gives rise to some useful lessons about making the best decisions in the worst of circumstances, a matter to which we return in Part 3.

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⁶⁸⁶ Although the period under consideration by Phase Two includes 2022, no lockdown restrictions applied that year.

⁶⁸⁷ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase One, Main Report (2024), Part 2 Section 3.2.1.4, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/main-report/part-two/3-2-what-happened

⁶⁸⁸ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase One, Main Report (2024), Part 2 Section 3.2.1.4, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/main-report/part-two/3-2-what-happened

⁶⁸⁹ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase One, Main Report (2024), Part 2 Section 3.3.1, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/main-report/parttwo/3-3-our-assessment

⁶⁹⁰ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase One, Main Report (2024), Part 2 Section 3.4, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/main-report/parttwo/3-4-what-we-learned-looking-back

⁶⁹¹ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase One, Main Report (2024), Part 2 Section 3.3.2, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/main-report/parttwo/3-3-our-assessment

⁶⁹² NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase One, Main Report (2024), Part 2 Section 3.3.3, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/main-report/parttwo/3-3-our-assessment

⁶⁹³ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase One, Main Report (2024), Part 2 Section 3.2, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/main-report/parttwo/3-2-what-happened NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase One, Main Report (2024), Part 2 Section 3.4, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/main-report/parttwo/3-4-what-we-learned-looking-back

⁶⁹⁴ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two (2026), Pandemic Perspectives, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/phase-two/pandemicperspectives, p 111

⁶⁹⁵ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two (2026), Pandemic Perspectives, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/phase-two/pandemicperspectives, p 151

⁶⁹⁶ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two (2026), Pandemic Perspectives, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/phase-two/pandemicperspectives, p 258

⁶⁹⁷ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two (2026), Pandemic Perspectives, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/phase-two/pandemicperspectives, p 149

⁶⁹⁸ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two (2026), Pandemic Perspectives, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/phase-two/pandemicperspectives, p 137

⁶⁹⁹ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two (2026), Pandemic Perspectives, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/phase-two/pandemicperspectives, p 146

⁷⁰⁰ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-20-SUB-0199 and CAB-20-MIN-0199, COVID-19: Preparing to Review New Zealand’s Level 3 Status (4 May 2020), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/Paperand-Minute-Preparing-to-Review-New-Zealands-Level-3-Status.pdf

⁷⁰¹ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0407, COVID-19 Response: 4 October Review of Alert Level Settings (4 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC9-04102021-COVID- 19-Response-4-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, Rec 24

⁷⁰² Calculated from the New Zealand Government COVID-19 Response Weekly Report (13 August 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Response-Weekly-Report-13-August-2021.pdf, p 14

⁷⁰³ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0370, COVID-19 Response: 13 September Review of Alert Level Settings (13 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC7-13092021-COVID-19-Response-13-September-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, paras 16, 19

⁷⁰⁴ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0379, COVID-19 Response: 20 September Review of Alert Level Settings (20 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC8-20092021-COVID-19-Response-20-September-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 108

⁷⁰⁵ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0406, COVID-19: A Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand: Report Back (4 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-AStrategy-for-a-Highly-Vaccinated-New-Zealand-Report-Back.pdfV2.pdf, Rec 14

⁷⁰⁶ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0407, COVID-19 Response: 4 October Review of Alert Level Settings (4 October 2021), Appendix 2, https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC9-04102021-COVID-19-Response-4-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf

⁷⁰⁷ Cabinet Paper, COVID-19 Response: 1 November Review of Alert Level Settings, https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL8-01112021-COVID-19-Response-1-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 36

⁷⁰⁸ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-MIN-0450, COVID-19 Response: 1 November Review of Alert Level Settings 1 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL8-01112021-COVID-19-Response-1-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 5

⁷⁰⁹ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-SUB-0476, COVID-19 Response: 15 November Review of Alert Level Settings (15 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL16-15112021-COVID-19-Response-15-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 3

⁷¹⁰ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-SUB-0476, COVID-19 Response: 15 November Review of Alert Level Settings (15 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL16-15112021-COVID-19-Response-15-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, Figures 1 and 2

⁷¹¹ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0497, COVID-19: Implementing the COVID-19 Protection Framework (22 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Implementing-the-COVID-19-Protection-Framework.pdf, Appendix 1, p 27

⁷¹² Te Niwha, Likely future pandemic agents and scenarios: An epidemiological and public health framework (November 2023), https://www.teniwha.com/assets/Uploads/Te-Niwha_Full-Report_Likely-futurepandemic-agents-and-scenarios_Web.pdf Chandana Balasubramanian, Understanding the basic reproduction number (RO): The key to tracking disease spread (18 December 2024), https://www.gideononline.com/blogs/understanding-the-basicreproduction-number-r0-the-key-to-tracking-disease-spread/Faculty of Public Health: HealthKnowledge, Epidemic theory (effective & basic reproduction numbers, epidemic thresholds) & techniques for analysis of infectious disease data (construction & use of epidemic curves, generation numbers, exceptional reporting & identification of significant clusters) (2009, revised 2018), https://www.healthknowledge.org.uk/public-health-textbook/research-methods/1a-epidemiology/epidemic-theory

⁷¹³ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Briefing: Update on Future COVID-19 Domestic Response Framework (10 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/Update-on-future-COVID-19-domestic-response-framework.pdf, p 10

⁷¹⁴ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0497, COVID-19: Implementing the COVID-19 Protection Framework (22 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Implementing-the-COVID-19-Protection-Framework.pdf, Appendix 2

⁷¹⁵ Stats NZ, Unemployment rate (last updated 6 August 2025), https://www.stats.govt.nz/indicators/unemployment-rate/

⁷¹⁶ The Treasury, COVID-19 Economic Support: Advice for 22 November Cabinet paper (15 November 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-09/c19-t2804-4581212.pdf, para 7

⁷¹⁷ The Treasury and Ministry of Social Development, Joint Report, Wage Subsidy August 2021 scheme: Second six-week review (2 November 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-09/c19-t2753-4618886.pdf, p 1

⁷¹⁸ Cabinet delegated the final decision to a group of ministers, following further advice from officials. The group comprised the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for COVID-19 Response and Associate Minister of Health. Cabinet Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0324, COVID-19: Auckland Community Case (17 August 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC1-17082021-Auckland-Community-Case.pdf

⁷¹⁹ The Minister for COVID-19 Response made an Order under the COVID-19 Public Health Response Act, after receiving advice from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Briefing: Alert Level Four – COVID-19 Public Health Response Orders (17 August 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AU07-17082021-Alert-Level-Four-COVID-19-Public-Health-Response-Orders.pdf

⁷²⁰ Cabinet Paper and Minute CAB-21-MIN-0036, COVID-19 Response: 23 August Review of Alert Settings (23 August 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC3-23082021-COVID-19-Response-23-August-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0330, COVID-19 Response: Further Auckland Community Cases: Review of Alert Level (20 August 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC2-20802021-COVID-19-Response-Further-Auckland-Community-Cases.pdf Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0344, COVID-19 Response: 27 August 2021 Review of Alert Level Settings (27 August 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC4-27082021-COVID-19-Response-27-August-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0351, COVID-19 Response: 30 August Review of Alert Level Settings (30 August 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC5-30082021-COVID-19-Response-30-August-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf

⁷²¹ Ministry of Health, Public Health Risk Assessment for Alert Level Consideration, Delta Outbreak August 2021 (12 September 2021)

⁷²² Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0370, COVID-19 Response: 13 September Review of Alert Level Settings (13 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC7-13092021-COVID-19-Response-13-September-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, paras 44–45

⁷²³ Ministry of Health, Public Health Risk Assessment for Alert Level Consideration, Delta Outbreak August 2021 (19 September 2021)

⁷²⁴ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0379, COVID-19 Response: 20 September Review of Alert Level Settings (20 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC8-20092021-COVID-19-Response-20-September-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, Minute recs 5, 7, p 2

⁷²⁵ Cabinet Minute, CBC-21-MIN-0106, Oral item: Proposals for Interim Alert Level Delta 1 Changes (15 September 2021)

⁷²⁶ Office of the Prime Minister, Hansard transcript, All of Government Press Conference (16 September 2021), https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-09/Press%20Conference%2016%20September%202021.pdf, p 9

⁷²⁷ Te Pūnaha Matatini is Aotearoa New Zealand’s Centre of Research Excellence for complex systems, based at the University of Auckland. It provided modelling of virus and health scenarios to the Government and to the public.

⁷²⁸ Nicholas Steyn, Michael Plank and Shaun Hendy, ‘Modelling to support a future COVID-19 strategy for Aotearoa New Zealand’, Te Pūnaha Matatini (23 September 2021), https://bpb-ap-se2.wpmucdn.com/blogs.auckland.ac.nz/dist/d/75/files/2017/01/modelling-to-support-a-future-covid-19-strategy-foraotearoa-new-zealand.pdf

⁷²⁹ COVID-19 Independent Continuous Review, Improvement and Advice Group Correspondence, Letter from Sir Brian Roche to Minister Hipkins (23 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/DO01-23-September-2021-letter-from-Sir-Brian-Roche-to-Minister-Hipkins.pdf

⁷³⁰ COVID-19 Independent Continuous Review, Improvement and Advice Group Correspondence, Letter from Sir Brian Roche to Minister Hipkins (23 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/DO01-23-September-2021-letter-from-Sir-Brian-Roche-to-Minister-Hipkins.pdf, p 1

⁷³¹ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0393, COVID-19, A Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand, (27 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-AStrategy-for-a-Highly-Vaccinated-New-Zealand.pdfV2.pdf, para 14, p 2 and Minute rec 5, p 1

⁷³² NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern (30 July 2025) NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Chris Hipkins (4 August 2025)

⁷³³ Ministry of Health Briefing, Delta Outbreak August 2021: Interim review of Alert Level Settings – 30 September 2021 (30 September 2021)

⁷³⁴ Ministry of Health Briefing, Delta Outbreak August 2021: Interim review of Alert Level Settings – 30 September 2021 (30 September 2021)

⁷³⁵ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0407, COVID-19 Response: 4 October Review of Alert Level Settings (4 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC9-04102021-COVID-19-Response-4-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, Minute recs 6, 10, p 2

⁷³⁶ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0407, COVID-19 Response: 4 October Review of Alert Level Settings (4 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC9-04102021-COVID-19-Response-4-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 9

⁷³⁷ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0422, COVID-19 Response: 18 October Review of Alert Level Settings (18 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC11-18102021-COVID-19-Response-18-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 12

⁷³⁸ Ministry of Health, Memo to Director-General of Health (1 October 2021)

⁷³⁹ Ministry of Health, Email to Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Early thoughts on DPMC’s Traffic light Cabinet paper – table comments / possible variation (draft only) (1 October 2021)

⁷⁴⁰ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0406, COVID-19: A Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand: Report Back (4 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-AStrategy-for-a-Highly-Vaccinated-New-Zealand-Report-Back.pdfV2.pdf, Minute rec 7

⁷⁴¹ Strategic COVID-19 Public Health Advisory Group, Letter to Hon. Dr Ayesha Verrall: Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand (8 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Public-Health-Advisory-Group-feedback-letter-from-Sir-David-Skegg.pdf, p 7

⁷⁴² Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Briefing: Update on Future COVID-19 Domestic Response Framework (10 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/Update-on-future-COVID-19-domestic-response-framework.pdf

⁷⁴³ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Briefing: Update on Future COVID-19 Domestic Response Framework (10 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/Update-on-future-COVID-19-domestic-response-framework.pdf, p 4

⁷⁴⁴ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Briefing: Update on Future COVID-19 Domestic Response Framework (10 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/Update-on-future-COVID-19-domestic-response-framework.pdf, p 5

⁷⁴⁵ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Briefing: Update on Future COVID-19 Domestic Response Framework (10 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/Update-on-future-COVID-19-domestic-response-framework.pdf, p 5

⁷⁴⁶ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Briefing: Update on Future COVID-19 Domestic Response Framework (10 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/Update-on-future-COVID-19-domestic-response-framework.pdf, p 5

⁷⁴⁷ Ministry of Health, Advice on the proposed new Traffic Lights system to manage COVID-19 community transmission in a vaccinated population (15 October 2021)

⁷⁴⁸ Ministry of Health, Advice on the proposed new Traffic Lights system to manage COVID-19 community transmission in a vaccinated population (15 October 2021)

⁷⁴⁹ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Draft Cabinet Paper, COVID-19: Confirming a Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand (15 October 2021) Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Draft Cabinet Paper, COVID-19: Confirming a Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand (16 October 2021)

⁷⁵⁰ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Draft Cabinet Paper, COVID-19: Confirming a Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand (15 October 2021)

⁷⁵¹ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Draft Cabinet Paper, COVID-19: Confirming a Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand (16 October 2021)

⁷⁵² Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Email, Traffic Light paper – Ministerial feedback (17 October 2021)

⁷⁵³ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Email, Covid Strategy reset paper – Director-General of Health and Minister of Health comments COVID-19: Confirming a Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand (17 October 2021)

⁷⁵⁴ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Email, Covid Strategy reset paper – Director-General of Health and Minister of Health comments COVID-19: Confirming a Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand (17 October 2021)

⁷⁵⁵ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Email and Draft Cabinet Paper, For consultation – Strategy for Vaccinated Population, COVID-19: Confirming a Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand (17 October 2021)

⁷⁵⁶ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Email and Draft Cabinet Paper, For consultation – Strategy for Vaccinated Population, COVID-19: Confirming a Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand (17 October 2021)

⁷⁵⁷ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern (30 July 2025)

⁷⁵⁸ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-421, COVID-19 Confirming a Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand (18 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Confirming-a-strategy-for-a-highly-vaccinated-New-Zealand.pdf, Minute rec 6

⁷⁵⁹ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0393, COVID-19: A Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand (27 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-AStrategy-for-a-Highly-Vaccinated-New-Zealand.pdfV2.pdf, para 24

⁷⁶⁰ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-421, COVID-19 Confirming a Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand (18 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Confirming-a-strategy-for-a-highly-vaccinated-New-Zealand.pdf, para 98

⁷⁶¹ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-421, COVID-19 Confirming a Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand (18 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Confirming-a-strategy-for-a-highly-vaccinated-New-Zealand.pdf, para 12

⁷⁶² Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-421, COVID-19 Confirming a Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand (18 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Confirming-a-strategy-for-a-highly-vaccinated-New-Zealand.pdf, para 75

⁷⁶³ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-421, COVID-19 Confirming a Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand (18 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Confirming-a-strategy-for-a-highly-vaccinated-New-Zealand.pdf, Minute rec 32, p 4

⁷⁶⁴ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Briefing: Targets for Transition to the COVID-19 Protection Framework (19 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/Targetsfor-Transition-to-the-COVID-19-Protection-Framework.pdf

⁷⁶⁵ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Briefing: COVID-19 Protection Framework Settings (20 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Protection-Framework-Settings.pdf, para 10

⁷⁶⁶ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-421, COVID-19 Confirming a Strategy for a Highly Vaccinated New Zealand (18 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Confirming-a-strategy-for-a-highly-vaccinated-New-Zealand.pdf, para 50

⁷⁶⁷ Rt. Hon. Jacinda Ardern, ‘New COVID-19 Protection Framework delivers greater freedoms for vaccinated New Zealanders’ (22 October 2021), https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-covid-19-protectionframework-delivers-greater-freedoms-vaccinated-new-zealanders

⁷⁶⁸ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-415, COVID-19 Response: 11 October 2021 Review of Alert Level Settings (11 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC10-11102021-

⁷⁶⁹ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-415, COVID-19 Response: 11 October 2021 Review of Alert Level Settings (11 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC10-11102021-COVID-19-Response-11-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, paras 62–63

⁷⁷⁰ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-422, COVID-19 response: 18 October Review of Alert Level Settings (18 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC11-18102021-COVID-19-Response-18-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, paras 28, 45.1

⁷⁷¹ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-422, COVID-19 response: 18 October Review of Alert Level Settings (18 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC11-18102021-COVID-19-Response-18-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 82

⁷⁷² Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0422 ,COVID-19 Response: 18 October Review of Alert Level Settings (18 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC11-18102021-COVID-19-Response-18-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 11

⁷⁷³ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0422 COVID-19 Response: 18 October Review of Alert Level Settings (18 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC11-18102021-COVID-19-Response-18-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 92

⁷⁷⁴ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0422, COVID-19 Response: 18 October Review of Alert Level Settings (18 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC11-18102021-COVID-19-Response-18-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, Minute rec 15

⁷⁷⁵ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-SUB-0450, COVID-19 Response: 1 November Review of Alert Level Settings (1 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL8-01112021-COVID-19-Response-1-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, paras 118–122

⁷⁷⁶ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-SUB-0463, COVID-19 Response: 8 November Review of Alert Level Settings (8 November 2021)

⁷⁷⁷ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-MIN-0476, COVID-19 Response: 15 November Review of Alert Level Settings(15 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL16-15112021-COVID-19-Response-15-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 48

⁷⁷⁸ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-MIN-0476 ,COVID-19 Response: 15 November Review of Alert Level Settings (15 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL16-15112021-COVID-19->Response-15-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 51

⁷⁷⁹ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-MIN-0476, COVID-19 Response: 15 November Review of Alert Level Settings (15 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL16-15112021-COVID-19-Response-15-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 51

⁷⁸⁰ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0477, COVID-19: Transition to the COVID-19 Protection Framework and the Auckland alert level boundary (15 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Transition-to-the-COVID-19-Protection-Framework-and-the-Auckland-Alert-Level-Boundary.pdf, rec 17 p 19, Minute agreed rec 17 p 2

⁷⁸¹ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0497, COVID-19 Implementing the COVID-19 Protection Framework (22 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Implementing-the-COVID-19-Protection-Framework.pdf

⁷⁸² Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Talking Points for Alert Level Review 22 November (21 November 2021)

⁷⁸³ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern (30 July 2025)

⁷⁸⁴ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0509, COVID-19 Response: Review of COVID-19 Protection Framework Settings for New Zealand (29 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/Review-of-COVID-19-Protection-Framework-Settings-for-New-Zealand.pdf, Minute rec 6

⁷⁸⁵ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Briefing: For signing: COVID-19 Public Health Response (Protection Framework) Order 2021 (30 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/For-Signing-COVID-19-Public-Health-Response-Protection-Framework-Order-2021.pdf

⁷⁸⁶ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Briefing: For signing: COVID-19 Public Health Response (Protection Framework) Order 2021 (30 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/For-Signing-COVID-19-Public-Health-Response-Protection-Framework-Order-2021.pdf

⁷⁸⁷ Some alert level decisions were made by Ministers with Power to Act, and a small number were made solely by the Minister for COVID-19 Response. This was especially the case in relation to Northland and Waikato.

⁷⁸⁸ The National Emergency Management Agency is the Government lead for emergency management. During the COVID-19 pandemic, it was hosted by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

⁷⁸⁹ Established in early 2021, the Business Leaders Forum was made up of 15 leaders from the business community, to provide opportunities for ministers to engage with the private sector in relation to the COVID-19 response. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Briefing: Establishment of COVID-19 Engagement Mechanisms for Business (18 March 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/MA4-18032021-Establishment-of-COVID-19-Engagement-Mechanisms-for-Business.pdf

⁷⁹⁰ Established and chaired by the Treasury, the Modelling Governance Group provided strategic direction< and oversight in relation to a modelling research programme.

⁷⁹¹ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern (30 July 2025)

⁷⁹² NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Chris Hipkins (4 August 2025)

⁷⁹³ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern (30 July 2025)

⁷⁹⁴ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern (30 July 2025)

⁷⁹⁵ In alert level Cabinet papers dated 11 October, 18 October, 1 November, 8 November and 15 November 2021, decision-makers were advised that ‘The data currently available does not allow for estimates of sub-regional impacts, or for estimates of the impacts of intermediate steps to ease Auckland’s Alert Level 3 restrictions’.

⁷⁹⁶ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern (30 July 2025)

⁷⁹⁷ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Brook Barrington (23 May 2025)

⁷⁹⁸ We heard some of this criticism in our engagement with Te Kaunihera Māori o Aotearoa New Zealand Māori Council (30 June 2025)

⁷⁹⁹ Waitangi Tribunal, Haumaru: The COVID-19 Priority Report, Wai 2575 (2023), https://www.waitangitribunal. govt.nz/assets/DOCUMENTS/Haumaru-W.pdf

⁸⁰⁰ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Chris Hipkins (4 August 2025)

⁸⁰¹ For example, Rt. Hon. Jacinda Ardern, Ministerial Diary Summaries for August 2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-09/2021%20August%20Proactive%20Diary%20Release_0.pdf; September 2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-10/Rt%20Hon%20Jacinda%20Ardern%20September%202021%20Ministerial%20Diary.pdf; October 2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-11/Rt%20Hon%20Jacinda%20Ardern%27s%20October%202021%20Ministerial%20Diary_0.pdf; November 2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-12/Rt%20Hon%20Jacinda%20Ardern%E2%80%99s%20November%202021%20Ministerial%20Diary.pdf; and December 2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-02/Rt%20Hon%20Jacinda%20Ardern%E2%80%99s%20December%202021%20Ministerial%20Diary.pdf; Hon. Grant Robertson, August Diary Summaries for August 2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-09/Ministerial%20Diary%20August%202021%20.pdf; September 2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-11/Ministerial%20Diary%20September%202021.pdf; October 2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-12/Ministerial%20Diary%20October%202021.pdf; November 2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-12/Ministerial%20Diary%20November%202021.pdf; and December 2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-02/Ministerial%20Diary%20December%202021.pdf; Hon. Chris Hipkins, Ministerial Diary Summaries for August 2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-03/August%202021.pdf; September 2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-04/September%202021%28final%29.pdf; October 2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-04/October%202021%28final%29.pdf; November 2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-04/November%202021.pdf and; December 2021, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-04/December%202021.pdf

⁸⁰² The Treasury, Report: Future of COVID Economic Supports (1 October 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-12/c19-4528420.pdf, para 44

⁸⁰³ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, engagement with Auckland Regional Business Boundary Forum (11 June 2025)

⁸⁰⁴ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, engagement with Te Kauniherao Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland Council and the Council’s Community Advisory Panels (9 June 2025)

⁸⁰⁵ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Terms of Reference, Community Panel – DPMC COVID-19 Group (updated 2 August 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2024-12/covid-19-community-panel-terms-reference.pdf

⁸⁰⁶ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Hon. Dr Ayesha Verrall (4 August 2025)

⁸⁰⁷ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Hon. Dr Ayesha Verrall (4 August 2025)

⁸⁰⁸ See Department of the Prime Minister of Cabinet, COVID-19: Insights, reports and research (26 January 2023), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/publications/covid-19-insights-reports-and-research

⁸⁰⁹ The Treasury, COVID economic strategy – update (17 September 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-12/c19-4521215.pdf The Treasury and Ministry of Social Development, Joint Report, Wage Subsidy August 2021 scheme: Six-week review (22 September 2021)

⁸¹⁰ The Treasury, Aide Memoire: Alert Level Impacts and Supply Chain Disruptions (5 November 2021)

⁸¹¹ The Treasury, Half Year Economic and Fiscal Update 2021 (15 December 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-12/hyefu21_2.pdf

⁸¹² Cabinet Paper, COVID-19 Response: Further Auckland Community Cases (20 August 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC2-20802021-COVID-19-Response-Further-Auckland-Community-Cases.pdf, para 35.4

⁸¹³ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0330 COVID-19 Response: Further Auckland Community Cases: Review of Alert Level (20 August 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC2-20802021-COVID-19-Response-Further-Auckland-Community-Cases.pdf, para 32

⁸¹⁴ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0344 COVID-19 Response: 27 August Review of Alert Level Settings (27 August 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC4-27082021-COVID-19-Response-27-August-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, paras 37–38

⁸¹⁵ The Treasury, Review of Alert Levels: 20 August (19 August 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-12/c19-4505175.pdf, p 2

⁸¹⁶ The Treasury, COVID-19 Wage Subsidy August 2021 Scheme: Second Payment (20 August 2021) The Treasury, Wage Subsidy August 2021 scheme: Alert Level transition (8 September 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-12/c19-4517848.pdf, para 18

⁸¹⁷ The Treasury, Future of the COVID-19 Response and Recovery Fund – purpose, criteria and process, (25 August 2021) The Treasury, Strategy for COVID economic response over next three months (27 August 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-12/c19-4506610.pdf, paras 18, 20–23

⁸¹⁸ The Treasury, Report: Supporting businesses’ ongoing costs during prolonged Alert Level restrictions (3 September 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-12/c19-4508706.pdf, paras 18–20

⁸¹⁹ The Treasury, Report: Supporting businesses’ ongoing costs during prolonged Alert Level restrictions (3 September 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-12/c19-4508706.pdf, paras 19

⁸²⁰ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0370, COVID-19 Response: 13 September Review of Alert Level Settings (13 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC7-13092021-COVID-19-Response-13-September-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 51

⁸²¹ The Treasury, COVID economic strategy – update (17 September 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-12/c19-4521215.pdf, para 17

⁸²² Comprising debit, credit and charge card transactions with New Zealand-based merchants.

⁸²³ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0415, COVID-19 Response: 11 October Review of Alert Level Settings (11 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC10-11102021-COVID-19-Response-11-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 77.1

⁸²⁴ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0422, COVID-19 Response: 18 October Review of Alert Level Settings (18 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC11-18102021-COVID-19-Response-18-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 54.1

⁸²⁵ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-SUB-0450, COVID-19 Response: 1 November Review of Alert Level Settings (1 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL8-01112021-COVID-19-Response-1-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 73.1

⁸²⁶ Consistent with this footnote, the Cabinet papers did not provide advice on the direct economic impacts of lockdowns in Waikato and Northland during October and November 2021. Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN 0415, COVID-19 Response: 11 October Review of Alert Level Settings (11 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC10-11102021-COVID-19-Response-11-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, footnote 3

⁸²⁷ Heart of the City Auckland, Submission to NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase One (23 March 2024), Appendices 2, 3

⁸²⁸ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-MIN-0450, COVID-19 Response: 1 November Review of Alert Level Settings (1 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL8-01112021-COVID-19-Response-1-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 73

⁸²⁹ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-MIN-0450, COVID-19 Response: 1 November Review of Alert Level Settings (1 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL8-01112021-COVID-19-Response-1-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 76

⁸³⁰ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-MIN-0450, COVID-19 Response: 1 November Review of Alert Level Settings (1 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL8-01112021-COVID-19-Response-1-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 74

⁸³¹ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-SUB-0463, COVID-19 Response: 8 November Review of Alert Level Settings (8 November 2021)

⁸³² Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0497, COVID-19 implementing the COVID-19 Protection Framework (22 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Implementing-the-COVID-19-Protection-Framework.pdf, paras 101–102

⁸³³ The Treasury and Ministry of Social Development, Joint Report, Wage Subsidy August 2021 scheme: Six-week review (22 September 2021)

⁸³⁴ The Treasury, He Tirohanga Mokopuna 2021: the Treasury’s combined Statement on the Long-term Fiscal Position and Long-term Insights Briefing (29 September 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/ltfp/he-tirohanga-mokopuna-2021

⁸³⁵ The Treasury, He Tirohanga Mokopuna 2021: the Treasury’s combined Statement on the Long-term Fiscal Position and Long-term Insights Briefing (29 September 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/ltfp/he-tirohanga-mokopuna-2021, p 10

⁸³⁶ The Treasury, Report: Future of COVID Economic Supports (1 October 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-12/c19-4528420.pdf, para 26

⁸³⁷ The Treasury and Ministry of Social Development, Joint Report, Wage Subsidy August 2021 scheme: Second six-week review (2 November 2021)

⁸³⁸ The Treasury and Ministry of Social Development, Joint Report, Wage Subsidy August 2021 scheme: Second six-week review (2 November 2021)

⁸³⁹ The Treasury, COVID-19 Economic Support: Advice for 22 November Cabinet paper (15 November 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-09/c19-t2804-4581212.pdf, p 5

⁸⁴⁰ The Treasury, COVID-19 Economic Support: Advice for 22 November Cabinet paper (15 November 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-09/c19-t2804-4581212.pdf, p 5

⁸⁴¹ The Treasury, COVID-19 Economic Support: Advice for 22 November Cabinet paper (15 November 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-09/c19-t2804-4581212.pdf, pp 5–6

⁸⁴² Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-SUB-0476, COVID-19 Response: 15 November Review of Alert Level Settings (15 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL16-15112021-COVID-19-Response-15-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, from para 54

⁸⁴³ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-MIN-0476, COVID-19 Response: 15 November Review of Alert Level Settings (15 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL16-15112021-COVID-19-Response-15-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 57

⁸⁴⁴ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-MIN-0476, COVID-19 Response: 15 November Review of Alert Level Settings (15 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL16-15112021-COVID-19-Response-15-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 52

⁸⁴⁵ Quarterly GDP figures from September 2021 show a 4.2 percent reduction in national GDP, followed by a reasonably substantial rebound of 4 percent in the December 2021 quarter, https://www.stats.govt.nz/indicators/gross-domestic-product-gdp/. This should be viewed with some caution, however, given the potential for lags in data.

⁸⁴⁶ Stats NZ, Unemployment rate (last updated 5 November 2025), https://www.stats.govt.nz/indicators/unemployment-rate/

⁸⁴⁷ The national GDP data is based on the published Stats NZ GDP data at that time. Subsequently, Stats NZ revised its GDP data for this period, but this did not substantially change the direction of the numbers. The Stats NZ regional GDP data was published after the corrected national GDP numbers for that period.

⁸⁴⁸ Infometrics, Quarterly Economic Monitor – Auckland I Tāmaki Makaurau (September 2025), https://qem.infometrics.co.nz/auckland/economic/gdp

⁸⁴⁹ The Treasury, Half Year Economic and Fiscal Update 2021 (15 December 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-12/hyefu21_2.pdf, p 3

⁸⁵⁰ Reserve Bank of New Zealand, ‘Inflation’ [n.d], https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monetary-policy/aboutmonetary-policy/inflation

⁸⁵¹ The Treasury, Half Year Economic and Fiscal Update 2021 (15 December 2021), https://www.treasury. govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-12/hyefu21_2.pdf, p 2

⁸⁵² The Treasury and Ministry of Social Development, Joint Report, Wage Subsidy August 2021 scheme: Second six-week review (2 November 2021)

⁸⁵³ Examples include: Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0330, COVID-19 Response: further Auckland Community Cases: Review of Alert Level (20 August 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC2-20802021-COVID-19-Response-Further-Auckland-Community-Cases.pdf, Appendix 5 Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0336, COVID-19 Response, 23 August Review of Alert LevelSettings (23 August 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC3-23082021-COVID-19-Response-23-August-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, Appendix 2

⁸⁵⁴ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-22-MIN-0344, COVID-19 Reponses: 27 August Review of Alert Setting (27 August 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC4-27082021-COVID-19-Response-27-August-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 44

⁸⁵⁵ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-22-MIN-0344, COVID-19 Reponses: 27 August Review of Alert Setting (27 August 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC4-27082021-COVID-19- Response-27-August-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, Appendix 3, para 7

⁸⁵⁶ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0351, COVID-19 Response: 30 August Review of Alert Level Settings (30 August 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC5-30082021-COVID-19-Response-30-August-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 53

⁸⁵⁷ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0360 (Revised), COVID-19 Response: 6 September 2021 Review of Alert Level Settings (6 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC6-06092021-COVID-19-Response-6-September-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 61

⁸⁵⁸ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0370, COVID-19 Response: 13 September Review of Alert Level Settings (13 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC7-13092021-COVID-19-Response-13-September-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, paras 58–60

⁸⁵⁹ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0379 COVID-19 Response: 20 September 2021 Review of Alert Level Settings (20 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC8-20092021-COVID-19-Response-20-September-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, paras 7, 51

⁸⁶⁰ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0379 Response: 20 September 2021 Review of Alert Level Settings (20 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC8-20092021-COVID-19-Response-20-September-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 63

⁸⁶¹ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0407, COVID-19 Response: 4 October Review of Alert Level Settings (4 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC9-04102021-COVID-19-Response-4-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf Appendix 1, para 4

⁸⁶² Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0407, COVID-19 Response: 4 October Review of Alert Level Settings (4 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC9-04102021-COVID-19-Response-4-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 54

⁸⁶³ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0422, COVID-19 Response: 18 October Review of Alert Level Settings (18 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC11-18102021-COVID-19-Response-18-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-MIN-0450, COVID-19 Response: 1 November Review of Alert Level Settings (1 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL8-01112021-COVID-19-Response-1-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf

⁸⁶⁴ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0415, COVID-19 Response: 11 October Review of Alert Level Settings (11 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC10-11102021-COVID-19-Response-11-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 11

⁸⁶⁵ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-SUB-0463, COVID-19 Response: 8 November Review of Alert Level Settings (8 November 2021)

⁸⁶⁶ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-SUB-0458, Wage Subsidy August 2021 Scheme: Second six-week Review (4 November 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-02/cab-21-sub-0458-wssaug21-4580756.pdf, paras 51–52

⁸⁶⁷ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-SUB-0458, Wage Subsidy August 2021 Scheme: Second six-week Review (4 November 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2022-02/cab-21-sub-0458-wssaug21-4580756.pdf, para 52

⁸⁶⁸ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-MIN-0476, COVID-19 Response: 15 November Review of Alert Level Settings (15 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL16-15112021-COVID-19-Response-15-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 12

⁸⁶⁹ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-MIN-0476, COVID-19 Response: 15 November Review of Alert Level Settings (15 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL16-15112021-COVID-19-Response-15-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, paras 61–63

⁸⁷⁰ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-MIN-0476, COVID-19 Response: 15 November Review of Alert Level Settings (15 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL16-15112021-COVID-19-Response-15-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, paras 64–68

⁸⁷¹ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0509, COVID-19 Response: 29 November 2021 Review of COVID-19 Protection Framework Settings for New Zealand (29 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/Review-of-COVID-19-Protection-Framework-Settings-for-New-Zealand.pdf, paras 56–60

⁸⁷² Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0509, COVID-19 Response: 29 November 2021 Review of COVID-19 Protection Framework Settings for New Zealand (29 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/Review-of-COVID-19-Protection-Framework-Settings-for-New-Zealand.pdf, para 60

⁸⁷³ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0360 (Revised), COVID-19 Response: 6 September 2021 Review of Alert Level Settings (6 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC6-06092021-COVID-19-Response-6-September-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 67

⁸⁷⁴ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0360 (Revised), COVID-19 Response: 6 September 2021 Review of Alert Level Settings (6 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC6-06092021-COVID-19-Response-6-September-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 64

⁸⁷⁵ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0360 (Revised), COVID-19 Response: 6 September 2021 Review of Alert Level Settings (6 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC6-06092021-COVID-19-Response-6-September-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 65

⁸⁷⁶ Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-MIN-0476, COVID-19 Response: 15 November Review of Alert Level Settings (15 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL16-15112021-COVID-19-Response-15-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 66

⁸⁷⁷ Diane Anderson, Clare Dominick, Emma Langley, Kecia Painuthara and Stephanie Palmer, Rapid Evidence Review: The immediate and medium-term social and psycho-social impacts of COVID-19 in New Zealand (May 2020), https://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-msd-and-our-work/publications-resources/statistics/covid-19/social-impacts-of-covid-19.pdf

⁸⁷⁸ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0360 (Revised), COVID-19 Response: 6 September 2021 Review of Alert Level Settings (6 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC6-06092021-COVID-19-Response-6-September-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, Appendix 2 Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0379, COVID-19 Response: 20 September Review of Alert Level Settings (20 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC8-20092021-COVID-19-Response-20-September-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, Appendix 1

⁸⁷⁹ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0370, COVID-19 Response: 13 September Review of Alert Level Settings (13 September 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC7-13092021-COVID-19-Response-13-September-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 59

⁸⁸⁰ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0407, COVID-19 Response: 4 October Review of Alert Level Settings (4 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC9-04102021-COVID-19-Response-4-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, paras 77, 82–88

⁸⁸¹ Cabinet Paper: Increasing face-to-face onsite education for Alert Level 3 regions (8 November 2021)

⁸⁸² Cabinet Paper, CAB-21-MIN-0476 ,COVID-19 Response: 15 November Review of Alert Level Settings (15 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL16-15112021-COVID-19-Response-15-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, paras 58–60

⁸⁸³ Ministry of Education, response to production order issued by NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two under section 20 of the Inquiries Act 2013 (7 March 2025)

⁸⁸⁴ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Ministry of Health, New Zealand Customs Service, Border Executive Board and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, COVID-19 Response Weekly Report (20 August 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Response-Weekly-Report-20-August-2021.pdf, p 10

⁸⁸⁵ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0336, COVID-19 Response, 23 August Review of Alert Level Settings (23 August 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC3-23082021-COVID-19-Response-23-August-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 24

⁸⁸⁶ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Ministry of Health, New Zealand Customs Service, Border Executive Board and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, COVID-19 Response Weekly Report (1 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/WR05-01102021-COVID-19-Response-Weekly-Report-1-October-2021.pdf, pp 7–9

⁸⁸⁷ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Ministry of Health, New Zealand Customs Service, Border Executive Board and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, COVID-19 Response Weekly Report (8 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/WR06-08102021-COVID-19-Response-Weekly-Report-8-October-2021.pdf, p 10

⁸⁸⁸ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Briefing: Update on Future COVID-19 Domestic Response Framework (10 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/Update-on-future-COVID-19-domestic-response-framework.pdf, pp 4–5

⁸⁸⁹ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Briefing: Update on Future COVID-19 Domestic Response Framework (10 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/Update-on-future-COVID-19-domestic-response-framework.pdf, p 10

⁸⁹⁰ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Briefing: Update on Future COVID-19 Domestic Response Framework (10 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/Update-on-future-COVID-19-domestic-response-framework.pdf, pp 10–11

⁸⁹¹ Ministry of Health, Public Health Risk Assessment for Alert Level Consideration, Delta Outbreak August 2021 Auckland and Rest of NZ (excluding Waikato and Northland) (14 October 2021)

⁸⁹² Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Ministry of Health, New Zealand Customs Service, Border Executive Board and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, COVID-19 Response Weekly Report (5 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Response-Weekly-Report-05-November-2021.pdf, pp 8–10

⁸⁹³ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Cabinet policy paper template (28 February 2020), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/publications/cabinet-policy-paper-template

⁸⁹⁴ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0422, COVID-19 Response: 18 October Review of Alert Level Settings (18 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC11-18102021-COVID-19-Response-18-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, para 53

⁸⁹⁵ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase One, Main Report (2024), Part 2 Section 2.6.1, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/main-report/parttwo/2-6-our-assessment

⁸⁹⁶ The Treasury, Wage Subsidy Scheme and Resurgence Support Payment: insights and update on costings (23 September 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-12/c19-4524936.pdf The Treasury and Ministry of Social Development, Joint Report, Wage Subsidy August 2021 scheme: Uptake, funding and operational matters (17 September 2021), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-12/c19-4518215.pdf

⁸⁹⁷ Chief Human Rights Commissioner, Race Relations Commissioner, Equal Employment Opportunities Commissioner and Disability Rights Commissioner.

⁸⁹⁸ For example, sentiment research by Perceptive Group Ltd in mid-September 2021 showed that ‘Over the past week, Aucklanders have felt significantly higher levels of stress (33% vs 26%), negativity (23% vs 16%), sadness (20% vs 15%), and anger (21% vs 11%) when compared to the rest of the country.’ Perceptive, COVID-19 Insights Tracker 2021/22 edition, https://www.perceptive.co.nz/2021-covid-19-insights-tracker

⁸⁹⁹ Ministers with Power to Act decided: (1) to move parts of Waikato to Alert Level 3 on 3 October 2021; (2) to expand the Waikato area under Alert Level 3 and to move Northland to Alert Level 3 on 8 October 2021; and (3) to move Upper Northland to Alert Level 3 on 2 November 2021. The Minister for COVID-19 Response decided: (1) to keep the Waikato area at Alert Level 3 on 21 October 2021; and (2) to move the Waikato area to Alert Level 3 stage 1 on 27 October 2021. All other alert level decisions regarding Northland and Waikato were taken by Cabinet.

⁹⁰⁰ For example, while the fact the decisions were made would subsequently be noted in Cabinet minutes, we have not seen advice relating to the decisions made by Ministers with Power to Act (as outlined in the footnote above).

⁹⁰¹ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Review of Alert Level Settings for the Waikato Alert Level 3 Area (21 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL4-21102021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings-for-the-Waikato-Alert-Level-3-Area.pdf Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Review of Alert Level Settings for the Waikato Alert Level 3 Area – 27 October (26 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL6-26102021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings-for-the-Waikato-Alert-Level-3-Area-27-October-2021.pdf

⁹⁰² Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-415, COVID-19 Response: 11 October 2021 Review of Alert Level Settings (11 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/ALC10-11102021-COVID-19-Response-11-October-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf

⁹⁰³ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Brook Barrington (23 May 2025)

⁹⁰⁴ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Chris Hipkins (4 August 2025)

⁹⁰⁵ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern (30 July 2025)

⁹⁰⁶ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Hon. Grant Robertson (28 July 2025) NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern (30 July 2025)

⁹⁰⁷ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview withRt. Hon. Chris Hipkins (4 August 2025)

⁹⁰⁸ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Ministry of Health, New Zealand Customs Service, Border Executive Board and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, COVID-19 Response Weekly Report (1 July 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Response-Weekly-Report-1-July-2021.pdf, p 8

⁹⁰⁹ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern (30 July 2025)

⁹¹⁰ Nicholas Steyn, Michael J. Plank, Rachelle N. Binny, Shaun C. Hendy, Audrey Lustig and Kannan Ridings, A COVID-19 Vaccination Model for Aotearoa New Zealand (30 June 2021), https://bpb-ap-se2.wpmucdn. com/blogs.auckland.ac.nz/dist/d/75/files/2017/01/a-covid-19-vaccination-model-for-aotearoa.pdf, Table 5

⁹¹¹ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Briefing: Update on Future COVID-19 Domestic Response Framework (10 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/Update-on-future-COVID-19-domestic-response-framework.pdf

⁹¹² NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase One, Main Report (2024), Part 2 Section 5.4.1.2, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/mainreport/part-two/5-4-what-happened-preparing-the-wider-system

⁹¹³ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Hon. Grant Robertson (28 July 2025)

⁹¹⁴ Stats NZ, Unemployment rate (last updated 5 November 2025), https://www.stats.govt.nz/indicators/unemployment-rate/

⁹¹⁵ Stats NZ, ‘Geographic units births and deaths by area (TA and RC) and industry 2001-2024’ [n.d], https://explore.data.stats.govt.nz/vis?fs[0]=Economy%2C0%7CBusiness%20demography%23CAT_BUSINESS_DEMOGRAPHY%23&pg=0&fc=Economy&bp=true&snb=14&df[ds]=ds-nsiwsdisseminate&df[id]=BDS_BDS_003&df[ag]=STATSNZ&df[vs]=1.0&dq=.RTOTAL%2BTTOTAL.TOTAL..&ly[rw]=YEAR_BDS_BDS_003%2CEVENT_BDS_BDS_003&ly[cl]=AREA_BDS_BDS_003%2CMEASURE_BDS_BDS_003&to[TIME]=false

⁹¹⁶ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Hon. Grant Robertson (28 July 2025)

⁹¹⁷ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern (30 July 2025)

⁹¹⁸ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern (30 July 2025)

⁹¹⁹ Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Briefing: Update on Future COVID-19 Domestic Response Framework (10 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/Updateon-future-COVID-19-domestic-response-framework.pdf, para 8

⁹²⁰ See also the expert report for the UK COVID-19 Public Inquiry by Professor Thomas Hale at paras 35–36: ‘The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing inequalities not only in health but also other spheres of society (Marmot & Allen, 2020). While there is little doubt that the disease itself has been more severe in the elderly (Ho et al, 2020), ethnic minorities (Pan et al, 2020), those with obesity, heart disease, or other comorbidities, and economically disadvantaged people (Laajaj et al, 2022), we have also seen above that the prolonged use of restrictive NPls has had differential effects on vulnerable groups of the population. Often, similar groups of people are at heightened risk of both COVID-19 and the “side effects” of responses to it, highlighting the dilemmas that vulnerable groups face.’ Professor Thomas Hale, Expert Report for the UK Covid-19 Public Inquiry: Module 2: Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker Evidence for UK COVID-19 Inquiry (22 August 2023), https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/inq000257925-report-by-professor-thomas-hale-titled-expert-report-forthe-uk-covid-19-public-inquiry-module-2oxford-covid-19-government-response-tracker-evidence-for-ukcovid-19-inquiry-dated-2/, paras 35–36

⁹²¹ Health New Zealand | Te Whatu Ora reports that since 1 January 2020 (to 17 July 2025), there have been 28 deaths from COVID-19 infections among under-20s. This can be compared with 5,180 deaths from COVID-19 infections among people aged 60 and above in the same period. See https://www.tewhatuora.govt.nz/for-health-professionals/data-and-statistics/covid-19/reporting

⁹²² NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Chris Hipkins (4 August 2025)

⁹²³ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Chris Hipkins (4 August 2025)

⁹²⁴ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Chris Hipkins (4 August 2025)

⁹²⁵ New Zealand Police, response to production order issued by NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two under section 20 of the Inquiries Act 2013 (6 March 2025)

⁹²⁶ Verian, Life Since the Pandemic: How the COVID-19 pandemic experience has shaped public attitudes and beliefs on public health, infectious disease and vaccination (November 2023), https://www.health.govt.nz/system/files/2024-05/life-since-the-pandemic-how-covid-19-pandemic-experience-shaped-publicattitudes-beliefs-16mar24.pdf, especially p 9

⁹²⁷ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Chris Hipkins (4 August 2025)

⁹²⁸ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern (30 July 2025)

⁹²⁹ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Chris Hipkins (4 August 2025)

⁹³⁰ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Hon. Grant Robertson (28 July 2025)

⁹³¹ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern (30 July 2025)

⁹³² Cabinet Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0343, COVID-19: Proposed Community Response Package 2021 (27 August 2021), https://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-msd-and-our-work/publications-resources/information-releases/cabinet-papers/2022/proposed-community-response-package/cab-21-min-0343-minute.pdf

⁹³³ Cabinet Minute, CMG-21-MIN-0024, COVID-19 – Government’s Response to Increased Ongoing Demand for Access to Food and Other Essential Wellbeing Items (9 September 2021), https://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-msd-and-our-work/publications-resources/information-releases/cabinet-papers/2022/response-to-increased-ongoing-demand/cmg-21-min-0024-minute.pdf

⁹³⁴ Cabinet Minute, CBC-21-MIN-0118, Additional Support for Low-Income Households Following COVID-19 Alert Level Restrictions (6 October 2021), https://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-msd-and-our-work/publications-resources/information-releases/cabinet-papers/2021/additional-support-for-low-incomehouseholds-following-covid-19-alert-level-restrictions/cbc-21-min-0118-minute.pdf

⁹³⁵ Cabinet Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0412, COVID-19: Responding to Sustained Demand for Access to Food and Other Essential Wellbeing Items (11 October 2021), https://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-msdand-our-work/publications-resources/information-releases/cabinet-papers/2022/sustained-demand-foraccess-to-food/cab-21-min-0412-minute.pdf

⁹³⁶ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Hon. Grant Robertson (28 July 2025)

⁹³⁷ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0406, COVID-19: A Strategy for a highly Vaccinated New Zealand: Report Back (4 October 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-AStrategy-for-a-Highly-Vaccinated-New-Zealand-Report-Back.pdfV2.pdf

⁹³⁸ Ministry of Social Development, Aide-Memoire to Hon. Carmel Sepuloni, COVID-19 Response: 4 October review of Alert Level Settings (4 October 2021)

⁹³⁹ Hon. Ayesha Verrall, response to production order issued by NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two under section 20 of the Inquiries Act 2013 (1 August 2025)

⁹⁴⁰ Waitangi Tribunal, Report, Haumaru: The COVID-19 priority report, Wai 2575 (2023), https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/assets/DOCUMENTS/Haumaru-W.pdf, section 4.2.8.2.1

⁹⁴¹ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern (30 July 2025)

⁹⁴² NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Chris Hipkins (4 August 2025)

⁹⁴³ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern (7 October 2025)

⁹⁴⁴ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern (30 July 2025)

⁹⁴⁵ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Dr Ian Town (1 May 2025) NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Professor Michael Baker (16 June 2025)

⁹⁴⁶ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase One, Main Report (2024), Part 2 Section 9.2.4, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/main-report/part-two/9-2-the-story-of-the-response, footnote (ii)

⁹⁴⁷ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase One, Main Report (2024), Part 3 Section 10.3, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/main-report/partthree-moving-forward/10-3-lessons-for-the-future, see ‘Spotlight example: Responding to changes in risk and vaccine-related protection’

⁹⁴⁸ Cabinet Paper, Supporting COVID-19 vaccination requirements in the workplace (26 October 2021), https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/19926-supporting-covid-19-vaccination-requirements-in-theworkplace-proactiverelease-pdf, p 25

⁹⁴⁹ Cabinet Paper, COVID-19 Response: 15 November Review of Alert Level Settings (25 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL16-15112021-COVID-19-Response-15-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, p 11

⁹⁵⁰ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-047,7 COVID-19: Transition to the COVID-19 Protection Framework and the Auckland alert level boundary (15 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Transition-to-the-COVID-19-Protection-Framework-and-the-Auckland-Alert-Level-Boundary.pdf, p 3

⁹⁵¹ Cabinet Paper and Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0477, COVID-19: Transition to the COVID-19 Protection Framework and the Auckland alert level boundary, (15 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/COVID-19-Transition-to-the-COVID-19-Protection-Framework-and-the-Auckland-Alert-Level-Boundary.pdf, p 4

⁹⁵² Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Briefing: For signing: COVID-19 Public Health Response (Protection Framework) Order 2021 (30 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/For-Signing-COVID-19-Public-Health-Response-Protection-Framework-Order-2021.pdf

⁹⁵³ For example, Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern told us: ‘It is not the case that we would’ve moved more quickly had those [electronic vaccine passes] been available earlier. In fact, the vaccine, the electronic availability of vaccine passes were two weeks in advance of the transition to the COVID Protection Framework. But it is the case that we wanted to be ready. We wanted to have those available because of course it was a very dynamic environment. We would’ve wanted to transition as soon as we felt comfortable to do so. But it would not be fair to say that the technology, the implementation held us back from moving to a different operating model had we been able to.’ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Dame Jacinda Ardern (30 July 2025)

⁹⁵⁴ New Zealand Bill of Rights Act vetting took place on a draft (not final) version of the Bill and was completed on 23 November 2021. Ministry of Justice, Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: COVID-19 (Vaccinations) Legislation Bill (23 November 2021), https://www.justice.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/20211123-NZ-BORA-Advice-COVID-19-Vaccinations-Legislation-Bill.pdf

⁹⁵⁵ COVID-19 Public Health Response Act, section 14(2) (as at 26 November 2021), https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2020/0012/294.0/LMS344182.html

⁹⁵⁶ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase One, Main Report (2024), Appendix D, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/main-report/appendices/d-vaccine-coverage-and-population-immmunity

⁹⁵⁷ Ministry of Health, MOH-COVID-Data Vaccine data update (20 October 2021), https://github.com/minhealthnz/nz-covid-data/blob/main/vaccine-data/2021-10-19/tla.csv

⁹⁵⁸ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase One, Main Report (2024), Part 2 Sections 3.3.1–3.3.2, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/main-report/part-two/3-3-our-assessment

⁹⁵⁹ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase One, Main Report (2024), Part 2 Section 2.6.2, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/main-report/parttwo/2-6-our-assessment

⁹⁶⁰ Cabinet Paper, COVID-19 Response: 8 November Review of Alert Level Settings (8 November 2021)

⁹⁶¹ Cabinet Paper, COVID-19 Response: 15 November Review of Alert Level Settings (15 November 2021), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-01/AL16-15112021-COVID-19-Response-15-November-2021-Review-of-Alert-Level-Settings.pdf, p 11

⁹⁶² Cabinet Minute, CAB-21-MIN-0476, COVID-19 Response: 15 November 2021 Review of Alert Level Settings (15 November 2021)

⁹⁶³ The Treasury, Te Ara Mokopuna: Treasury’s 2025 Long-term Insights Briefing (August 2025), https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2025-08/te-ara-mokopuna-ltib-2025.pdf, p 17

⁹⁶⁴ NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, analysis of Stats NZ’s Integrated Data Infrastructure and Longitudinal Business Database

⁹⁶⁵ Crown Law Office, Affidavit of Dr Ashley Robin Bloomfield on behalf of the respondents, NZDSOS v Minister for COVID-19 Response, CIV-2021-485-595 (18 February 2022) NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two, interview with Rt. Hon. Chris Hipkins (15 September 2025)

⁹⁶⁶ See NZ Royal Commission of Inquiry into COVID-19 Lessons Learned: Phase Two (2026), COVID-19 by the Numbers, https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/phase-two/covid-19-by-the-numbers/

⁹⁶⁷ Education Review Office, Back to class: How are attitudes to attendance changing? Summary (2025), https://www.evidence.ero.govt.nz/media/svzhs1uk/back-to-class-how-are-attitudes-to-attendancechanging-summary-report.pdf